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INTRODUCTION
In 1980, scientific research funded by the federal
government was at a crossroads. Up until that time, very little
of this research ever generated products that benefited the
public that had paid for the research. Congress studied the
problem and concluded that the culprit was, at least in part, a
governmental policy of not patenting the inventions that arose
from such research, or, when patents were obtained, a policy of
refusing to license the patents on an exclusive basis.1 Without
the protection of a patent or exclusive license, private
companies were reluctant to proceed with the next phase—
development of saleable products—because they feared that
once they had done the hard (and expensive) part, other
companies would step in and free-ride on their efforts.2 In
response, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act3 as a means to
utilize the incentives of the patent system to persuade
companies to develop inventions into products. Under the
Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of government funding may (subject
to certain rights retained by the government) obtain patents on
their inventions and then sell or license those patents as they
see fit, including granting exclusive licenses.4
The Act has dramatically changed the way universities

1. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1663, 1685-87 (1996) (discussing the findings of the Commission on
Government Procurement). See generally id. at 1671-91 (discussing the
history of technology transfer prior to 1980).
2. See id. at 1672-75, 1681-82.
3. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-203.
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operate and how they interact with private industry.5
Universities and other recipients of government research
funding have vastly expanded their patenting and licensing
activities in an attempt to bring in revenue from patents on
Most
inventions developed in university laboratories.6
universities now routinely obtain and license patents, and some
have made enormous amounts of money off their patent
portfolios.7 Much of this revenue has come from companies,
which now routinely monitor university research in search of
technology that can be licensed and developed into marketable
products.8 Thus, in many instances, the Bayh-Dole Act has had
exactly the desired effect of generating products for the benefit
of the public.
However, from its inception, the Act has had its critics.
Recently, Professors Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg have
expressed dissatisfaction with the current implementation of
the Bayh-Dole Act.9 They assert that while some inventions
that would otherwise have languished are now exploited
because of the Act, other inventions that would have been
developed anyway are now being developed under the auspices
of the Act.10 As a consequence, these latter inventions now
carry a “tax” in the form of a royalty that subsequent
researchers must pay to the patent holder, and this royalty is
then passed on to the ultimate consumer, the public. Since
these inventions would have been developed and used without
the patent incentives provided by the Act, they argue, the Act
requires that the public pay extra for something it otherwise
would have obtained more cheaply.11 Thus, from a societal
standpoint, patenting such inventions is undesirable.
To solve this problem, the authors propose requiring the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to evaluate each grant it
5. See generally, e.g., Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology
Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1729,
1731-32 (1996) (discussing the impact of Bayh-Dole on university research and
technology transfer).
6. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-09; Massaro, supra note 5, at
1731-32.
7. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1710-11 (giving examples of patents
bringing large revenues to universities).
8. See id. at 1709.
9. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).
10. See id. at 295.
11. See id. at 300-01.
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makes and decide whether any invention (or inventions) that
might result from the research conducted pursuant to that
grant would or would not be further developed without a
patent.
If the NIH concludes that any such potential
inventions would be developed without a patent, the grant
should prohibit the researcher from patenting them; otherwise,
the grant should permit the researcher to patent them.12 While
this solution is perhaps appealing in the abstract, it is
unworkable in practice.
It suffers from difficulties both
practical—the NIH lacks the institutional competence and
personnel to perform such an analysis effectively—and
fundamental—for the vast majority of inventions, nobody could
make such a decision ex ante.
This Article proposes an alternative reform.
Any
researcher whose work is funded by federal funds should have
a limited, royalty-free license to make or use, for research
purposes on the funded project, any patent for which the
underlying invention was developed with federal funds. The
license would be strictly limited to research activities, and
would not extend to the right to sell or otherwise commercialize
the patented invention; the patentee would retain all rights to
commercialize the invention.
Focusing on the user and whether he or she receives
federal funds, rather than on the Rai and Eisenberg test aimed
at assessing the desirability of patenting the invention, greatly
simplifies the job of the NIH while addressing many of the
complaints voiced by critics of the Bayh-Dole Act. The terms of
this license would, of course, require careful drafting to prevent
the licensee’s overreaching into the commercial arena. The
license would have the further benefit of implementing a
limited form of experimental use, and it might also serve as the
foundation for a “patent pool” in the biotechnology industry,
resulting in increased availability of the tools and techniques of
the trade, whether developed with or without government
funding.
The following discussion focuses primarily on the NIH and
biotechnology patents, because that is the area Rai and
Eisenberg address in their article and is also the area with
which I have the most familiarity. In addition, biotechnology
patents are currently an area of great contention, and many
12. See id. at 310-11.
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commentators advocate substantial changes with U.S. patent
law and policy in the realm of biotechnology. Due to its
universal nature, however, the licensing reform that I propose
could also be expanded to apply to other agencies and fields.
Indeed, implementation of the proposed reform at the NIH
might serve as a model for later adoption by other agencies.
Part I of this Article covers the history and structure of the
Bayh-Dole Act, as well as some basic patent law doctrines and
concerns. Part II examines in detail the reform proposed by
Professors Rai and Eisenberg, highlights some of the problems,
and concludes that it is unworkable. Part III then explores the
proposed new license for recipients of government funding,
including possible ways to implement it. It also discusses the
potential benefits of the proposal and addresses some of its
weaknesses.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE BAYH-DOLE ACT
1. History
The federal government has long been a major source of
funding for scientific research, and as a consequence it has
become the owner of many patents that resulted from this
research. Prior to 1980, however, almost no one ever developed
Statistics
or used most of these patented inventions.13
indicated that only about four percent of the patents issued
under NASA, Department of Defense (DoD), and NIH grants
were ever used.14 Thus, while the government was spending
taxpayer money on research, the taxpayers were not getting

13. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1664, 1702. The following discussion
is derived in considerable part from Professor Eisenberg’s work.
14. Id. at 1702. The four percent figure comes from the sources cited in
note 159 therein. See The University and Small Business Patent Procedures
Act: Hearings on S. 414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 2
(1979) [hereinafter Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings] (statement of Sen. Birch
Bayh); id. at 28 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); id. at 32 (statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch); id. at 46 (testimony of Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General
of the United States) (citing FEDERAL COUNCIL ON SCIENCE & TECH., REPORT
ON GOVERNMENT PATENT POLICY, 1973-76 (1978)). Professor Eisenberg notes
that these statistics are open to challenge. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at
1702-03.
However, the basic premise—that many government-funded
inventions were not getting out of the lab—is generally accepted.
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useful products in return.15 Desiring to increase the return on
federal investments in research, Congress began looking for
ways to get these taxpayer-funded inventions developed into
commercial products.16
The first step in designing such a reform was to figure out
why the development rate was so low. The problem traced its
roots, at least in part, to a split within and among the various
agencies (and commentators observing the agencies) between
two competing views and practices on the proper policy for the
patenting of federal research: the license policy or the title
policy.17
For agencies practicing the license policy, the government
kept only a license to use technology developed with federal
funds, for its own use; title resided with the funding recipient
who actually performed the research.18 Advocates of this policy
argued that it gave funding recipients the necessary incentive
to bid on government contracts and then to proceed to develop
the inventions made under them. Licensing policy advocates
believed that if title in these inventions rested with the
government and it granted only nonexclusive licenses, firms
would be unwilling to take such licenses.19 These firms would
worry that their competitors would wait for them to develop the
markets and work out kinks in the technology, and then steal
their markets by getting similar licenses from the government.
Since these later competitors would avoid the startup costs,
they would then undercut the original firm, destroying
profitability.20
For agencies practicing the title policy, the government
retained full title to inventions developed with government
funding and thus owned all resulting patents.21 Advocates of
this policy believed that the public had an equitable claim to
the research for which it paid, and therefore the government
should protect the public by retaining title in the technology,
15. Another impetus behind the Bayh-Dole Act was concern that
innovating American firms frequently lost out to foreign competitors. See
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1665.
16. See, e.g., Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 14, at 3 (statement of
Sen. Birch Bayh).
17. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1674-75.
18. See id. at 1674.
19. See id. at 1674-75.
20. See id. at 1673.
21. See id. at 1674.
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either dedicating it to the public domain or granting
nonexclusive licenses.22 Otherwise, the government would be
inappropriately involved in selecting licensees, policing
licensees, and policing infringement.23 If nonexclusive licenses
turned out to be insufficient to get the product developed by the
private sector, then the government should step in and finance
the necessary further development itself, on behalf of the
public.24
Historically, Congress did not set forth uniform policy on
this issue, and so for many years different agencies took
different approaches to handling patents arising out of funded
research, generally following one or the other of the two
described policies.25 Indeed, one of the stated purposes for the
adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act was to create a uniform policy to
replace the twenty-six separate variations of the licensing and
title policies then in effect for the various funding agencies.26
Earlier, in 1963, President Kennedy had issued a
presidential memorandum that attempted to set a more
general policy somewhere in between the title and licensing
policies, recognizing the advantages and disadvantages of
each.27 The memorandum provided guidelines for determining
when the government should retain title, but it ultimately left
agencies with considerable discretion.28
One important outcome of the memorandum was that it
led, indirectly, to a detailed study of the issue by Harbridge
House.29 The Harbridge House study found low usage rates of
inventions made with government funding, particularly when
22. See id. at 1673-74.
23. See id. at 1673.
24. See id. at 1673-74. Professor Eisenberg points out the interesting fact
that almost no one considered a policy of not getting patents at all and simply
publishing to prevent others from subsequently obtaining patents. She gives
some practical reasons why patenting might be more effective, but it is still
interesting that this option was not even discussed. See id. at 1675-76.
25. See generally id. at 1671-95.
26. See Senate Bayh-Dole Hearings, supra note 14, at 2 (statement of Sen.
Birch Bayh); id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole) (citing Bradley Graham,
Patent Bill Seeks Shift to Bolster Innovation, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 1979); id. at
33 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
27. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1677-79 (citing Memorandum and
Statement of Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943 (Oct. 10, 1963)).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1679-82 (citing 1 HARBRIDGE HOUSE, GOVERNMENT PATENT
POLICY STUDY, FINAL REPORT FOR THE FCST COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
PATENT POLICY, at ii (1968)).
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the government held title.30 The report ultimately concluded,
however, that its data could not resolve the debate, and that
the preferable policy depended on the invention in question—
that is, some inventions would only be developed into useful
products if the government held title, while other inventions
would be unlikely to be developed if the government held title.31
In 1971, President Nixon issued a subsequent presidential
memorandum stating that agencies could grant more than
minimal, nonexclusive rights where such rights were necessary
to get the inventions developed into commercial products, thus
endorsing the licensing policy in at least some contexts.32
However, this memorandum raised questions regarding
whether the agencies had the power to take such actions absent
congressional authorization, as they arguably transferred
property belonging to the United States, a power the
Constitution reserves to Congress.33
Meanwhile, in 1969, Congress established the Commission
on Government Procurement to research licensing issues.34
The Commission eventually issued its report in 1972. The
Commission’s final report deferred to the intervening 1971
presidential memorandum so that empirical data resulting
from the memorandum’s implementation could inform future
policy decisions.35 However, the Commission also suggested an
alternative approach: Congress should replace all existing
relevant statutes with a uniform government policy that would
generally leave title in the hands of funding recipients, subject
to strengthened government “march-in” rights.36 This policy
would also have two exceptions: The government should retain
title to inventions that it planned to develop to completion, and
30. See id. at 1680.
31. See id. at 1681-82.
32. See id. at 1684-89 (citing Memorandum and Statement of Government
Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,887 (Aug. 26, 1971)).
33. See id. at 1687-88.
34. See id. at 1685-87.
35. See id. at 1685-86.
36. See id. at 1686-87. March-in refers to the right of an agency to “march
in” and force the patentee to grant third parties a license to a patent arising
from work performed with funds provided by the agency. See 35 U.S.C. § 203
(2000 & Supp. II 2002). An agency may march in only under very specific
circumstances, such as when the patentee is not developing the invention or
cannot meet the demand for a patented technology that is important for health
or safety. Id. § 203(a)(1), (2). March-in is discussed in more detail infra notes
93-95 and accompanying text.
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educational and nonprofit institutions generally would not
receive title.37
Finally, in 1979, President Carter, in the context of his
Domestic Policy Review on Industrial Innovation, investigated
the situation and indicated support for a policy of getting title
out of the hands of the government and into the hands of
funding recipients.38
By and large, the title policy prevailed before 1980. The
general aim of the agencies was to achieve widespread
dissemination of the results obtained in laboratories operating
with federal money and to encourage wide development and
usage through dedication to the public domain and
nonexclusive licenses.
Universities, however, became increasingly frustrated over
changes in the ways in which the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare (HEW), now the Department of Health
and Human Services, and the DoD handled patent rights.39
Beginning in the 1960s, the HEW rule was to let universities
retain patent rights as long as they had an approved technology
transfer system in place, and to allow them to grant exclusive
rights to industry under Institutional Patent Agreements
(IPAs).40 These generalized requirements obviated the need for
case-by-case waivers for each invention, which pleased the
Then in 1978, HEW’s general counsel
universities.41
recommended rethinking IPAs, as they limited the agency’s
control over the availability and cost of HEW-sponsored
inventions. At the same time, HEW began taking longer to
review individual requests for patent rights. This change in
policy created concern that HEW was reverting to older policies
and led to pressure for legislation to make the existing
arrangements permanent and non-discretionary.42
Meanwhile, DoD generally allowed funding recipients to
retain title as long as they had “an established commercial
position in the field.”43 This worked well for industry funding
recipients, but it created a problem for universities, which had
no such positions and therefore had to seek approval for each
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1687.
See id. at 1689-91.
See id. at 1691-93.
See id. at 1692-93.
See id. at 1692.
See id. at 1692.
See id. at 1692.
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invention. Many universities worked around this problem by
taking advantage of a general “special situations” exception
that allowed them to retain title without the need for
individualized approval.44 However, in 1975, DoD revised its
regulations to eliminate this exception. Under the revised
regulations, universities needed to show an established
technology transfer program in the field of the invention, not
merely an approved patent policy as previously required. The
change led to an eighty percent increase in deferred, case-bycase determinations of whether the university was permitted to
take title or whether title should remain with the agency.45
Although these determinations were generally resolved in the
universities’ favor, they were time-consuming, and the
universities found the bureaucratic burden frustrating.46
2. Enactment and Implementation
Congress pulled all these varying threads together in 1980,
enacting two pieces of legislation aimed at increasing
development of federal research into private sector products:
the Bayh-Dole Act and the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act.47
a. Policy and Affected Parties
The Bayh-Dole Act focuses on small businesses and
nonprofit entities receiving federal funding, such as
universities and research foundations.48 The Act as passed was
silent as to large funding recipients,49 who would continue
44. See id. at 1692-93.
45. See id. at 1693.
46. See id.
47. The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act is discussed infra
Part I.A.3.
48. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-28 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
49. “Large” in this context refers to the residual category of funding
recipients that fit neither the definition of “small business firm,” 35 U.S.C.
§ 201(h), nor the definition of “nonprofit organization,” id. § 201(i). The
definition of “small business firm” refers to 15 U.S.C. § 632, which states: “For
the purposes of this chapter [that is, 15 U.S.C. ch. 14A—Aid to Small
Business, which, inter alia, establishes the Small Business Administration], a
small-business concern . . . shall be deemed to be one which is independently
owned and operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation.” 15
U.S.C.A. § 632(a)(1) (1997 & Supp. 2005), referenced in 35 U.S.C. § 201(h).
The Bayh-Dole definition further incorporates the “implementing regulations
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under the existing regime of agency-by-agency determination.50
The Act encourages small businesses and nonprofit funding
recipients to patent the results of government-sponsored
research by allowing them to retain title to the inventions if
they diligently file patent applications and promote commercial
development of the inventions.51 The Act also clarifies the
authority of federal agencies to hold patents and license them
on an exclusive or nonexclusive basis.52
Not surprisingly, universities and small businesses
supported the Act and its clarification of their right to retain
title.53 Large businesses would have preferred to have been
included; indeed, the Carter Administration had wanted to
make the Act more comprehensive, but failed to do so.54
However, large businesses were no worse off as they were still
able to obtain title via individualized agency determinations,
and therefore they did little more than grumble over their
exclusion from the Act.55 This differential treatment was
ultimately eliminated in 1983, when President Reagan issued a
memorandum extending Bayh-Dole to large businesses.56 This
extension was later quietly endorsed by Congress as part of a
housekeeping provision in 1984.57
Since its passage, the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act has
gradually expanded. As the Act now stands, almost any party
involved in creating an invention that wants to obtain a patent
on it can prevail over any party that does not want the
invention to be patented.58 The funding recipient gets priority
in electing to retain title in the subject invention.59 If the
recipient declines, the sponsoring agency may receive title to
the invention.60 If neither of these parties seeks to patent the
of the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 201(h).
50. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1691.
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 202.
52. See id. §§ 207-209.
53. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1693.
54. See id. at 1693-94.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 1694-95 (citing Memorandum to the Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies: Government Patent Policy, 1 PUB. PAPERS 248
(Feb. 18, 1983)).
57. See id. at 1694-95, 1704 n.168 (citing Trademark Clarification Act of
1984, § 501(13), 35 U.S.C. § 210(c) (1994)).
58. See id. at 1666.
59. See id. at 1666 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (1994)).
60. See id.
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invention, the opportunity falls to the individual inventor.61
In essence, the Bayh-Dole Act expresses a strong
preference for allowing funding recipients (or, if the recipients
are not interested, individual inventors) to retain rights in
inventions created with federal funding.62 The policy and
objectives of the Act are to maximize the return on federal
research dollars by getting inventions made with government
funding into the hands of those who will develop them—
preferably small businesses located in the United States—for
the benefit of the public in general.63 However, the government
should retain sufficient rights to serve its own needs and
protect the investment of the public in the inventions.64 The
rights are therefore subject to certain limited exceptions: denial
of such rights in very limited “exceptional circumstances,”65 the
government’s retention of a license to use (or have used on its
behalf) any government-funded invention,66 and a very limited
agency march-in right.67
b. Terminology and Implementation
The Bayh-Dole Act and its implementing regulations use
the broad term “funding agreement” to mean “any contract,
grant, or cooperative agreement entered into between any
Federal agency . . . and any contractor for the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole

61. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(d)). Actually, the statutes are slightly
ambiguous on the order of precedence when the funding recipient declines to
patent. Section 202(c)(2) states “the Federal Government may receive title to
any subject invention in which the contractor does not elect to retain rights or
fails to elect rights within [the statutory] times.” 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2) (2000 &
Supp. II 2002). Section 202(d) states “[i]f a contractor does not elect to retain
title to a subject invention in cases subject to this section, the Federal agency
may consider and after consultation with the contractor grant requests for
retention of rights by the inventor subject to the provisions of this Act and
regulations promulgated hereunder.” Id. § 202(d). Thus, the statutes seem to
give both parties the opportunity to patent. However, given that the statute
gives the Federal agency the authority to approve the inventor’s request, it
could presumably deny the request on the grounds that the agency elected to
patent the invention itself.
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a), (d).
63. See id. § 200.
64. See id.
65. See id. § 202(a)(ii).
66. See id. § 202(c)(4).
67. See id. § 203.
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or in part by the Federal government.”68 In the federal system,
“contracts” and “grants” have specific technical meanings.69
Contracts are used when the government needs a solution
to a particular scientific or technical problem, for its own
purposes and under its own control.70 For example, when the
NIH wanted to create a Molecular Libraries Small Molecule
Repository (that is, a facility that could maintain and supply a
collection of small molecules that might be of interest to
researchers throughout the NIH), it issued a contract
68. Id. § 201(b); 37 C.F.R. § 401.2(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
69. The basics of the federal procurement system are set forth in 31
U.S.C. Chapter 63. Section 6301 states that the general purpose of this
chapter is to clarify under what circumstances agencies should use which type
of funding arrangement. See 31 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000). Section 6303 specifies:
An executive agency shall use a procurement contract as the legal
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States
Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient
when—
(1) the principal purpose of the instrument is to acquire (by purchase,
lease, or barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the
United States Government; or
(2) the agency decides in a specific instance that the use of a
procurement contract is appropriate.
Id. § 6303. Section 6304 specifies:
An executive agency shall use a grant agreement as the legal
instrument reflecting a relationship between the United States
Government and a State, a local government, or other recipient
when—
(1) the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of
value to the State or local government or other recipient to carry out a
public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law of the
United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or barter)
property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United States
Government; and
(2) substantial involvement is not expected between the executive
agency and the State, local government, or other recipient when
carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement.
Id. § 6304. Part 35 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (F.A.R.), which
addresses “Research and Development Contracting,” evokes this distinction:
Contracts shall be used only when the principal purpose is the
acquisition of supplies or services for the direct benefit or use of the
Federal Government. Grants or cooperative agreements should be
used when the principal purpose of the transaction is to stimulate or
support research and development for another public purpose.
48 C.F.R. § 35.003(a) (2005). As one commentator has observed, “Few things
are as befuddling as the parlance involved in the doling out of the federal
largesse.” Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Federal Research Grants: Who Owns the
Intellectual Property?, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (1986).
70. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6303; see also Diane M. Sidebottom, Updating
the Bayh-Dole Act: Keeping the Federal Government on the Cutting Edge, 30
PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 230-31 (2001).
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solicitation (through the auspices of the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH)).71 Similarly, the NIH (through the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID))
issued a contract solicitation when it wanted assistance
developing products that could operate as countermeasures
against radiological threats.72
Grants, on the other hand, are used when the government
wishes to fund the scientific enterprise more broadly, rather
than to solve a specific problem.73 Grantees are typically much
freer to explore as they see fit, relatively free of government
control.74 Thus, almost all extramural, investigator-initiated
research sponsored by NIH is funded through grants. For
example, the NIH has used grants to fund research into novel
ways of using retroviral vectors to make a vaccine against
HIV75 and mechanisms for regulating gene transcription using
novel “protein nucleic acid” molecules.76 Thus, even though
71. See National Inst. of Mental Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., RFP No. RM-04-0001, Molecular Libraries Small Molecule Repository
(Dec. 29, 2003), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/contracts/ROADMAP04-0001.pdf.
72. See National Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Disease, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Services, Solicitation No. RFP-NIH-NIAID-DAIT-05-37,
Medical Countermeasures Against Radiological Threats: Product Development
Support
Services
(April
27,
2005),
available
at
http://www.niaid.nih.gov/contract/archive/RFP0537.pdf.
A list of open
Requests
for
Proposals
at
the
NIH
is
available
at
http://ocm.od.nih.gov/ContractOpportunity/rfps/mainpage.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2006). A similar list for the entire federal government is available at
“FedBizOpps,” http://www.fbo.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2006).
73. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6304; see also Sidebottom, supra note 70, at
231.
74. See Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“In a
grant program the federal government gets the advantage of services rendered
by someone who is doing his own thing, his own autonomous thing.”).
75. See Grant No. 1R03AI044677-01, HIV/SIV Structural Gene Vectors as
a
Live
HIV
Vaccine
(May
1,
1999),
available
at
http://crisp.cit.nih.gov/crisp/CRISP_LIB.getdoc?textkey=2799594&p_grant_nu
m=1R03AI04467701&p_query=&ticket=15293961&p_audit_session_id=71335355&p_keywords=
(providing the abstract for the grant).
76. See Grant No. 5R01GM060642-06, Controlling Gene Expression With
Peptide
Nucleic
Acids
(July
1
2000),
available
at
http://crisp.cit.nih.gov/crisp/CRISP_LIB.getdoc?textkey=6915683&p_grant_nu
m=5R01GM06064206&p_query=&ticket=15293933&p_audit_session_id=71335355&p_keywords=
(providing the abstract of the grant). The NIH issues grants to fund almost
any imaginable type of research relating to the life sciences. Individual grants
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grants are ultimately embodied in contracts in the legal sense,
they are not considered “contracts” in the technical way that
term is used in the Bayh-Dole Act. Therefore, to avoid
confusion, I will follow the Act’s convention of using the broader
terms “funding agreement” and “federally funded research[er]”
(or obvious variants thereof) to refer to both types of
arrangements collectively.
The Act defines a “subject invention” as “any invention of
the [funding recipient] conceived or first actually reduced to
practice in the performance of work under a funding
agreement.”77 The Act broadly implements a policy that favors
placing ownership of these inventions created with government
funds in the hands of the funding recipient: “Each nonprofit
organization or small business firm may . . . elect to retain title
to any subject invention.”78 To obtain these rights, the funding
recipient must make a specific election to retain rights within a
specified timeframe79 and file patent applications prior to any
patent bar dates.80 Should the recipient decline to exercise its
right to patent, the agency can then either elect to patent the
invention itself81 or grant the individual inventor’s request to
retain rights in the invention.82 Congress placed authority to
implement the Act in the Department of Commerce.83
The Act also contains certain exceptions that limit the
scope of the patent owner’s rights. These limitations mostly
relate to foreign contractors84 or to inventions related to
security85 or weapons.86 In addition, a funding agreement may
refuse to allow the retention of title “in exceptional
circumstances when it is determined by the agency that
may be found in the CRISP database. See Computer Retrieval of Information
on Scientific Projects, http://crisp.cit.nih.gov/ (last visited April 14, 2006).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
78. Id. § 202(a).
The funding recipient must comply with various
disclosure and reporting requirements to retain rights to the invention,
including reporting the existence of the invention to the agency, id. § 202(c)(1),
and keeping the agency apprised of progress toward patenting, and utilizing
the invention, id. § 202(c)(5).
79. See id. § 202(c)(2).
80. See id. § 202(c)(3).
81. See id. § 202(c)(2).
82. See id. § 202(d). See supra note 61 for a discussion of the interaction
between § 202(c) and § 202(d).
83. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(b)(1), 206, 207(b), 208.
84. See id. § 202(a)(i).
85. See id. § 202(a)(iii).
86. See id. § 202(a)(iv).
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restriction or elimination of the right to retain title to any
subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives
of this chapter.”87 That is, the funding agency may, in
“exceptional circumstances,” decide that a particular invention
should not be patented or that the agency should retain title.
However, the Act makes clear that any such exercise is to be
strictly limited, with specific substantive and procedural
requirements for any such determination,88 administrative
oversight,89 and specific appeal rights for the funding
recipient.90
Under §202, the government also reserves certain rights in
subject inventions:
With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights,
the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable [sic],
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on
behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the
world: Provided, That the funding agreement may provide for
[certain] additional rights.91

Thus, the government may itself practice any invention it
funded, and it may also authorize others to practice the
invention on its behalf. The funding recipient must also place
notice in any patent applications on retained inventions,
informing the public of the government’s rights in the
inventions.92
Under certain circumstances and subject to certain
procedural safeguards, the funding agency may require the
rights holder to assign rights to another party.93 If the rights
holder refuses, the agency may “march in” and itself grant such
rights.94 Section 203(a)(1)-(4) permits the agency to march in if
it determines that: the owner of the patent has not taken
sufficient steps to put the invention into practice, the owner
cannot meet the demand for an invention important to health
or safety, the owner cannot meet the need for the invention as
required by a Federal regulation, or the owner has in some way
violated the provisions requiring a preference for United States
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. § 202(a)(ii).
See id. § 202(b)(1).
See id. § 202(b)(2), (3).
See id. § 202(b)(4).
Id. § 202(c)(4).
See id. § 202(c)(6).
See id. § 203(a), (b).
See id.
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industry.95
3. The Stevenson-Wydler Act
Around the same time as it passed the Bayh-Dole Act,
Congress also passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act,96 which was a counterpart to the Bayh-Dole
Act. The Stevenson-Wydler Act applied to research conducted
by the government or government actors (for example, by
scientists at the NIH), where no outside funding recipient
existed to take the rights and develop the inventions under the
Bayh-Dole Act. Thus, the government was given the role of
acting as its own licensor. Stevenson-Wydler directed the
research agencies to get more involved in technology transfer
when there was no external funding recipient, and to grant
exclusive licenses more frequently.97
The Stevenson-Wydler Act made technology transfer an
explicit part of the federal research enterprise. Under the Act,
“[t]echnology transfer, consistent with mission responsibilities,
is a responsibility of each laboratory science and engineering
professional,”98 and federal agencies should “strive where
appropriate to transfer federally owned or originated
technology to State and local governments and to the private
sector”99 and set aside funds to support technology transfer.100
The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986101 took these
ideas a step further, allowing government-operated laboratories
to enter into cooperative research and development agreements
(CRADAs) with industry, in which the laboratories agree in
advance to assign patent rights to industry.102
The combined result of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler is
this: On the extramural side, Congress encourages agencies to
forego patent rights, in favor of funding recipients who will
either develop the technology themselves or license it to others
95. See id.
96. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3701–3717 (1998 &
Supp. 2005)).
97. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1705-06.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 3710(a)(2).
99. Id. § 3710(a)(1).
100. See id. § 3710(b)(2).
101. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785 (1986).
102. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1706. Subsequent amendments have
pushed further in this direction. See id. at 1706-08.
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to develop. Meanwhile, on the intramural side, it encourages
agencies to seek patents more actively so that they can license
these patents to industry for development.103 Thus, the Acts
employ a dual-pronged strategy to clear away government
obstacles to patenting by funding recipients and to encourage
individuals and institutions lacking their own development
capacities to own and share patent rights.104
4. Reaction and Criticism
Many view the Bayh-Dole Act as a rousing success.105
Patent activity by research universities and other funding
recipients has expanded dramatically, and some of the
resulting patents have generated enormous income for their
institutions.106 Awareness of patents and their uses has also
expanded, leading to both increased industry-university
collaboration and the rise of a large number of start-up
companies
to
commercialize
patents
licensed
from
universities.107 Thus, in many ways, the Bayh-Dole Act has
achieved many of its goals.
Not everyone, however, has hailed the Bayh-Dole Act as a
success.
Many commentators still stress one of the
“fundamental” arguments against Bayh-Dole Act—the concern
over “double paying.”108 The Bayh-Dole Act allows for private
ownership of patents on inventions created with public funds,
103. See id. at 1708.
104. See id. at 1709.
105. See id. at 1708 (“Since its passage in 1980 the Bayh-Dole Act has been
consistently hailed as an unqualified success in stimulating the commercial
development of discoveries emerging from government-sponsored research in
universities.”); Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment, Defending the
Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the
Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J.
359, 372-74 (2004) (discussing the role of Bayh-Dole in getting many
biotechnology inventions commercialized). See generally, e.g., Massaro, supra
note 5 (discussing the changes and benefits Bayh-Dole has brought to
university research).
106. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-10; Massaro, supra note 5, at
1731-32; Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 292, 300-01.
107. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1708-09; Ramirez, supra note 105, at
376.
108. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666. Representative Jack Brooks was
a major proponent of this argument in the debates surrounding the passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1 at 29-32, (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6487, 6487-91 (dissenting views of Honorable Jack
Brooks).
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and these patents allow the patent holders to charge users
increased prices for the protected inventions. Because the
public paid for the research that led to the invention in the first
place, the argument goes, why should the public have to pay a
second time in the form of monopoly prices on the fruits of the
research? The argument is a good one, with strong intuitive
appeal.109 However, the premise underlying Bayh-Dole is that,
prior to the Act, the public was paying for the research and
deriving no benefit from it (at least not in the form of
commercial products), thus wasting public funds. Accepting
this premise, then,110 the actual choice is between the pre-Act
result of paying once and getting nothing, or the Act’s result of
paying twice and getting something, in the form of commercial
products.111 Bayh-Dole operates on the assumption that the
latter situation is preferable.
Other commentators have questioned the need for BayhDole at all. According to these commentators, the purpose of
the patent system is to give inventors the incentive to perform
research leading to inventions. The Bayh-Dole Act, however,
applies only to research conducted with federal funding, which
funding should itself provide the necessary incentive to perform
the inventive research. Thus, the argument goes, since the
government funding allows the public to get the results without
the need for the patent incentive, why should the public now
allow the inventor to get a patent on the results?112
However, the Bayh-Dole Act was concerned not with the
initial incentive to perform the inventive research, but rather
with the subsequent incentive to develop the resulting
inventions into useful products.113 Even after an invention is
109. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666 (noting that Bayh-Dole
implements “a counterintuitive policy in a number of respects” and citing inter
alia the double-paying argument).
110. And not everyone does. See, e.g., id. at 1703-04 (discussing the
argument that the patent-licensing statistics are misleading, and that
government-funded inventions were, in fact, widely used).
111. There is, of course, always the choice of eliminating public funding of
research, and thus paying only the monopoly rents on inventions from the
private sector. The discussion of this option is well beyond the scope of this
Article.
112. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666-67 (presenting this as another
reason the Bayh-Dole policy is “counterintuitive”); id. at 1668-69 (discussing
this “standard instrumental argument for patents”).
113. See id. at 1669-70. Indeed, some argue that the incentive to develop is
the more important incentive generated by the patent system. See generally,
e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
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made, extensive further development may be required to
convert the basic idea into a final product; indeed, development
costs typically greatly exceed research costs.114 While the
government may perform and fund basic research, it typically
does not perform or fund this subsequent development
research, preferring to leave this task to private industry.
Absent a patent or exclusive license to a patent, or some other
mechanism that allows recovery of these development costs,
however, firms will be unwilling to incur such costs. If the
rights in government inventions are freely available to all, then
any firm that pays to develop such an invention runs the risk
that later competitors will jump in and undercut it, as the
competitors would be able to charge lower prices because they
did not incur the development costs. The Bayh-Dole Act
effectively gets the invention into the hands of industry, the
more appropriate place for such product development.115
B. PATENT LAW CONCERNS
The Bayh-Dole Act brought an increased role for patents in
government-funded research, but it also highlighted the
tension between the patent system and the government-funded
research system. Both systems have the ultimate goal of
advancing scientific progress and thereby benefiting society as
a whole, but in the short run patents may sometimes interfere
with scientific progress. Patents conferring exclusive rights to
basic discoveries or tools (that is, tools that are not themselves
intended to be developed into consumer products, but that are
nevertheless important in facilitating future research that may
lead to such products) may obstruct further research into
important areas, as may multiple patents covering different
pieces of a larger research enterprise. Various solutions have
arisen to address some of these obstructions, including
infringement exemptions for basic research and the sharing of
patents in patent pools. This Section explores some of these
obstructions and solutions (or proposed solutions) for relieving
these obstructions. The proposed Bayh-Dole licensing scheme
presented in this Article utilizes some aspects of these solutions
to help resolve the tension created by allowing patents on
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
114. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1669.
115. Id.
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research funded by the public.
1. The Patent Right and Blocking Patents
A patent is a personal property right in an invention.116
Importantly, the fundamental patent right is a negative right
rather than a positive right.117 As U.S. statutory patent law
makes clear, the only right conferred by a patent is the right to
exclude another from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or
sell[ing] any patented invention, within the United States or
import[ing] into the United States any patented invention”;118 a
patent gives the patentee no positive right to do anything. For
example, a patent on a potential pharmaceutical does not give
the patentee the right to sell a pharmaceutical product to the
public; the Food & Drug Administration (FDA), not the Patent
& Trademark Office, is the entity charged with approving
drugs for sale, and the existence of a patent is largely
irrelevant to the approval process.119 The patent on the
pharmaceutical simply gives the patentee the right to prevent
anyone else from selling that pharmaceutical.120
Because they are personal property rights, patent rights
may be licensed or assigned (sold) to others.121 As the patent
right is a negative right, a patent license is in reality the
patentee’s promise not to sue the licensee for infringement.122
Furthermore, patent rights are divisible: “A patentee may limit
the grant of rights awarded under a license. A licensee could,
for example, obtain the right to use a patented invention but
not to sell it.”123 In addition, there are two broad categories of
patent licenses. An exclusive license grants all of the patent
rights to a single licensee and requires that the patentee grant
no further licenses, while a nonexclusive license allows the
patentee to grant licenses to many parties.124 These attributes
may also be combined, as in, for example, an exclusive license
to make the patented invention or an exclusive license to all of
116. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (“Patents shall have the attributes of
personal property.”).
117. See ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 4 (2004).
118. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (2001 & Supp. 2005).
119. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 362.
122. See id. at 364.
123. Id. at 364.
124. See id. at 365.
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the rights to the invention in a particular geographic region or
commercial market.125
The positive right/negative right distinction comes into
play with blocking patents.126 Two patents are said to “block”
each other when a later invention infringes an existing patent,
but is nonetheless patentable itself.127 In such a case, neither
patentee can practice the new invention without a license from
the other. For example, if A has a patent on a new drug and B
then obtains a patent on an improved method of making that
new drug, neither patentee can make the drug using the new
process without infringing the other’s patent: A’s patent allows
A to exclude B from making the patented drug by any method,
but B’s patent allows B to exclude A from making the patented
drug by the improved method.128 For anyone to make the drug
by the improved method, the parties will have to work out some
Alternatively, different
sort of licensing arrangement.129
parties might own patents on components that need to be
combined to make a saleable product. Neither party can build
the complete product without a license from the other. For
example, if one party owns the patent on the television tuner
and another party owns the patent on the television tube,
neither party will be able to build a complete television without
a license from the other. The parties generally resolve this
fairly common situation by agreeing to license each other, often
called cross-licensing.
The negative right granted by a patent is a major strength
of the patent system, but in some circumstances it can lead to
problems. The presence of multiple overlapping rights over a
piece of technology can operate to block development of that
technology, as no one can get sufficient rights to advance the
technology.130 Problems also may arise when a patent on a core
125. See, e.g., Waterman v. Mackenzie, 138 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1891)
(discussing various possible license terms).
126. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4-5 (citing Robert P.
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdowns: The Case of
Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994)). See generally ROBERT PATRICK
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES &
MATERIALS 88-89, 392-93 (3d ed. 2002) (discussing blocking patents).
127. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4-5 & n.3.
128. Cf. id. at 4-5 (using the example of a patented mousetrap and an
improved version of the mousetrap).
129. See id. at 5.
130. This problem arose in the early days of the airplane and automobile
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technology is used to block development of future research.131
Various solutions have been used or proposed to address these
issues, including an explicit legal exemption for experimental
use and the sharing of patent rights among the members of an
industry, both of which will be discussed below.
2. Anticommons
One possible ramification of the negative patent right is
that it may create an “anticommons” that leads to underuse of
a particular technology. The anticommons concept has its roots
in an influential article in Science in 1968, in which Garrett
Hardin proposed the “tragedy of the commons.”132 According to
this theory, “people often overuse resources they own in
common because they have no incentive to conserve.”133 Over
time, Hardin’s paper became “a powerful justification for
privatizing commons property.”134 In 1998, again in Science,
Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg propounded
an inverse “tragedy of the anticommons.”135 According to this
theory, the reverse situation may also arise: If too many people
have rights to exclude others from a piece of property, then that
In particular,
piece of property may be underused.136
Professors Heller and Eisenberg propose that too many patent
rights are being awarded in the biotechnology field, and these
patents are interfering with the progress of research in this
area.137
Professors Heller and Eisenberg present their theory this
way:
[A] resource is prone to underuse in a “tragedy of the anticommons”
when multiple owners each have a right to exclude others from a
scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use. In
theory, in a world of costless transactions, people could always avoid
commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. In
industries. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293,
1342-47 (1996).
131. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 126, at 393.
132. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698
(1998) (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE
1243 (1968)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
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practice, however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction
costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases of participants, with
success more likely within close-knit communities than among hostile
strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into
usable private property is often brutal and slow.138

The authors worry that exactly this situation is emerging
in the biotechnology field, particularly with “upstream” basic
research that is needed to feed “downstream” applied
research.139 They note that changes in U.S. policy, exemplified
by legislation such as Bayh-Dole, have led to increased
patenting of discoveries that in the past would have been left to
the public domain.140 Accompanying this increased patenting
in the public sector is an increase in both the number of
biotechnology companies and their awareness of the value of
intellectual property rights.141 Taken together, these trends
have led to more pieces of the biotechnology landscape being
covered by proprietary rights, typically patent rights.142
Because the patent right is the right to exclude, researchers in
the biotechnology field are at risk of being excluded from
advancing their research.
Professors Heller and Eisenberg point to two mechanisms
currently in place that may lead to an anticommons in
biotechnology. The first mechanism involves the tendency to
give concurrent rights in potential future products.143 For
example, the authors note that many researchers may wind up
with patents on individual segments of a particular gene
sequence, each patent hindering the others from doing further
basic research on the gene as a whole.144 Similarly, a wide
division of ownership of the various genes needed for a test to
screen for useful pharmaceuticals might prevent any one
researcher from collecting all the pieces needed to perform the
screen.145
The second mechanism involves the increased “stacking” of
licenses.146 An increasingly common type of license to use
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. (endnotes omitted).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 699.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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biotechnology research tools is the “reach-through” license,
which requires the licensee to pay the patentee a royalty on any
product developed using the patented technology, whether the
patented technology appears in the final product or not.147
When a large number of these upstream patented technologies
are needed to create a particular saleable product, the
aggregation of license fees may make the project economically
untenable.148
After concluding that these mechanisms may contribute to
the rise of a biotechnology anticommons, the authors explore
whether such an anticommons is likely to persist if it does
arise.149 They cite three reasons why it might. First, the
transaction costs of bargaining are high, and biotechnology
firms might not be able to bear these high costs.150 Bearing
high costs is particularly difficult for the nonprofit entities such
as universities that—through Bayh-Dole—hold a large number
of the important patents.151 Furthermore, the rights involve
such a wide variety of techniques that valuing them is difficult,
and this uncertainty increases disputes over license terms.152
Finally, other considerations, particularly antitrust laws, may
stand in the way of effective bargaining.153
Second, the diverse range of interested parties in the
biotechnology industry will impede resolution of anticommons
problems.154 For example, public entities (such as the NIH)
view themselves as playing an important role in facilitating
public health, and thus desire to spread discoveries and
inventions widely. Meanwhile, private entities generally will
prefer to keep their inventions closer to home, benefiting from
the monopoly on the resource.155 Another conflict is between
those entities performing “upstream” basic research and those
performing “downstream” applied research. The latter would
clearly prefer that the tools they need be widely available,
while the former might prefer to maximize their return by

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See id.
See id. at 699-700.
See id. at 700-01.
See id. at 700.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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granting limited or even exclusive licenses to the tools.156
Differences in culture may also lead to differing perspectives on
the propriety of enforcing and/or infringing patents.157
Third, cognitive biases may impede bargaining.158 In
particular, owners of upstream research tools are all likely to
view their particular tool as the most vital to the success of the
whole project, even though their tool is only one of many
needed in the project, and therefore are likely to overvalue
their own contribution. As a consequence, they will all tend to
demand more compensation than their contribution is worth to
the developer. No rational developer will be willing to pay the
price to obtain access to all of the necessary tools.159
Researchers may also be loathe to bargain with a scientific
rival, even when the transaction might be economically
advantageous for both parties.160
In the end, Professors Heller and Eisenberg conclude that
“[a]n anticommons in biomedical research may be more likely
to endure than in other areas of intellectual property because of
the high transaction costs of bargaining, heterogeneous
interests among owners, and cognitive biases of researchers.”161
They then finish with a few policy suggestions, recommending
more careful use of privatization of research results, clearer
patent limits on upstream patents, and decreased use of
restrictive terms in licenses to upstream patents.162
“Otherwise, more upstream rights may lead paradoxically to
fewer useful products for improving human health.”163
3. Experimental Use
The common law experimental use exemption164 is an
156. See id.
157. See id. at 700-01.
158. See id. at 701.
159. See id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id.
164. This Article uses the term “experimental use exemption” rather than
“research exemption,” as that is the term more commonly used in the
literature. This usage is not to be confused with the doctrine of “experimental
use” as applied to negating a prior public use or sale. See, e.g., City of
Elizabeth v. Am. Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) (applying the
experimental use doctrine); see also Gregory N. Pate, Analysis of the
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important but narrow patent law doctrine that exempts certain
uses of patented inventions from claims of infringement. The
doctrine traces its roots to Justice Story’s 1813 opinion in
Whittemore v. Cutter.165 According to Justice Story, “it could
never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a
man, who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency
of the machine to produce its described effects.”166 Justice
Story subsequently distinguished this type of use from “the
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere
purpose of philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity
and exactness of the specification.”167 As Judge Newman of the
Federal Circuit recently noted, in 1813 when these cases were
decided, “philosophical experiments” referred to “natural
philosophy”—what we now call simply “science.”168 Justice
Story’s creation rapidly evolved into an accepted defense to
infringement, as evidenced by its inclusion in treatises from the
late nineteenth century.169
The experimental use exemption is premised on the idea
that patent law is eminently a utilitarian doctrine. As a
consequence, pure research not directed towards profits should
not be deemed an infringement, as it does not interfere with
the pecuniary interests of the patentee.170 Similarly, one of the
major purposes of the patent system is to provide an incentive
for inventors to disclose their invention and thereby get
Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253, 256 (2002) (noting that
“[t]he ‘experimental use exception’ actually describes two entirely separate
[patent law] doctrines”).
165. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813).
166. Id. at 1121.
167. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1813).
168. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 874-75
n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005);
see also Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District of Columbia —
Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither Party at 6-8,
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 031237) (“Later cases show that the term ‘philosophical,’ as used in Whittemore I,
is synonymous with the term ‘scientific.’”).
169. See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (discussing the history of the experimental use exemption and citing
W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890)).
170. And as a corollary of this view of the doctrine, research done in a
corporate context is virtually never deemed to be eligible for the exemption.
See Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 617, 626-30 (1985)
(collecting cases).
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technical information into the hands of those who can make use
of it.171 Thus, the common law experimental use exemption, as
traditionally understood, allows for non-commercial research
on the patented invention.172
Commentary on the common law experimental use
exemption has been mixed. Some commentators believe that
any but the most minimal exemption is entirely inappropriate
and undermines the strength of the patent system.173 Others
counter that the doctrine plays a crucial role in the law,
particularly in accommodating patent law to the norms of
science (principally the scientific norm of the free sharing of
ideas and techniques as part of a unified endeavor), especially
in the realm of “basic” research, and in resolving otherwise
intractable sharing problems (such as anticommons).174
The commentators often divide experimental use into three
basic categories.175 The first category traces its roots back to
171. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 12.
172. For a summary and discussion of some of the varying proposed
implementations of an experimental use system, including its widespread use
in foreign patent systems, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 108-17 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin
& Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) (chapter entitled “Seven Recommendations for a
21st-Century Patent System: Shield Some Research Uses of Patent Inventions
from Infringement Liability”).
173. See generally, e.g., Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of
Patent Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 357 (1957); Jordan P. Karp,
Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad
Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991); Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of
Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in
Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 201-05, 211-16
(2004); Ramirez, supra note 105, at 384-88.
174. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of
Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017
(1989); Hantman, supra note 170; Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”:
Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental
Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457 (2004); Katherine J. Strandburg,
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 81 WIS.
L. REV. 81 (2004). Cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in
Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing a “fair use” right for
patent law based on the copyright fair use doctrine; the impact of this right
would be similar to experimental use).
175. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 34-37 (2003)
INNOVATION
REPORT],
available
at
[hereinafter
FTC
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
(discussing
the
three
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Justice Story’s formulation—”for the purpose of ascertaining
the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects”176 and “to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
specification.”177 In other words, later researchers are allowed
to experiment with the patented invention to make sure that it
works as claimed and that its description in the patent
specification complies with the patent laws.178 Without such a
right, competitors would have no way of determining the
validity of the patent, and the patent would be effectively
This aspect of
invincible to this type of challenge.179
experimental use is relatively uncontroversial and is generally
accepted, even by those who reject a broader experimental use
right.180
The second category of experimental use involves research
on the patented invention for the purpose of designing around
it or improving upon it.181 This category is more controversial.
For those commentators who accept experimental use in
If
general, this category is their prime motivation.182
categories).
176. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. May 1813).
177. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. Oct. 1813).
178. The patent laws require that:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). Failure to comply with these enablement and written
description requirements results in the patent being invalid. See id. § 282
(2000) (listing as a defense to infringement “[i]nvalidity of the patent or any
claim in suit for failure to comply with any requirement of section[] 112 . . . of
this title”).
179. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1074-75. Professor Eisenberg also
notes that such scrutiny of the results of others is important to the integrity of
the scientific enterprise itself. See id. at 1053-55.
180. See, e.g., FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36
(“Both scholarly analysis and Hearing participants favor an experimental use
defense in the first setting. Research to determine if or how a patented
invention works essentially makes effective the required enablement
disclosure.” (footnote omitted)); Karp, supra note 173, at 2176-77. Indeed, it
seems so accepted as to have never been challenged in court.
181. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36.
182. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1078 (“A patent holder should
not be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented invention in subsequent
research in the field of the invention, which could potentially lead to
improvements in the patented technology or to the development of alternative
means of achieving the same purpose.”); Hantman, supra note 170, at 639-40
(“[A]ctivity directed to improvements and new uses for patented technology

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028852

422

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 7:2

subsequent researchers cannot experiment on the claimed
invention for these purposes, the reasoning goes, what is the
point of the detailed disclosure provisions of the Patent Act?183
As Judge Newman recognized in her dissent in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA:
The patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention, including
details of enabling experiments and technical drawings and best
modes and preferred embodiments, even commercial sources of
special components. Such details would be idle and purposeless if
this information cannot be used for 17-20 years [that is, the length of
the patent term]. . . . To the contrary, the patent system both
contemplates and facilitates research into patented subject matter,
whether the purpose is scientific understanding or evaluation or
comparison or improvement. Such activities are integral to the
advance of technology.184

Patentees understandably oppose such a right, because
exempting these types of uses runs directly counter to their
economic interests—the exemption is aimed at providing
alternatives to the patented invention.185 Supporters of the
exemption respond that such uses are an important part of
experimental use—indeed, as Judge Newman noted, such uses
are fundamental to the patent system itself. A major goal of
the patent system is to get patented inventions into the hands
of researchers so that they can be exploited in these ways.186
Successful research, if the resulting product no longer infringes
the patent, could be handled with a royalty on any commercial
products.187
The third and most controversial category is research tools,
that is, tools that facilitate research into other areas.188 The

should fall within the experimental use exception.”).
183. Indeed, one commentator argues:
[E]xperimental use aimed at understanding, designing around, or
improving a patented invention is merely an extension of disclosure
[as required in § 112]. . . . “Experimenting on” a patented invention
can, and should, be broadly permitted, regardless of commercial
intent, as a means of ensuring that the public receives the benefit of
its patent bargain with respect to follow-on innovation.
Strandburg, supra note 174, at 146.
184. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
185. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1075-76
186. See Hantman, supra note 170, at 643.
187. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1078-79 (suggesting such a remedy).
188. See id. at 1074; Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
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sole purpose of research tools is to facilitate subsequent
research, and thus the only market for research tools is
researchers.189 If researchers are exempt from infringement of
such tools, then the patentee has no one left to exclude, and so
cannot recoup its development costs. Allowing experimental
use of such tools effectively destroys any market for them, and
Even the
therefore any incentive to develop them.190
commentators who favor the experimental use exemption often
exclude research tools, limiting the exemption to further
research into the thing patented for purposes of improving on
or designing around the patent.191 However, some recent
commentators—particularly
those
concerned
with
anticommons and related problems in the biotechnology area—
advocate expanding the exemption to cover even research tools,
at least when these tools are being unreasonably withheld and
are not available through the anonymous market.192
Research tools are a particularly hot topic in biotechnology.
The NIH appointed a working group, the NIH Working Group
on Research Tools, to study the issue. The Working Group
189. See Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1072-74.
190. Id. (“An experimental use exemption seems most likely to undermine
critical patent incentives when the researcher is an ordinary consumer of an
invention with a primary or at least significant market among research
users.”).
191. Id. (“Nor does it seem likely that a research exemption is necessary to
ensure that scientists will have access to such an invention: the patent holder
will see research users as potential customers rather than hostile rivals and
will want to extend licenses to them in order to extract the full value of the
patent monopoly.”); Hantman, supra note 170, at 639; FTC INNOVATION
REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36 (“Inventors of tools used by researchers
need an income stream from those who use their inventions. The Hearing
record provides no basis for exempting such tools from patent protection, and
leading scholarly commentary agrees.”); Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at
(Newman, J., dissenting) (“A research tool . . . is as subject to the patent right
as is any other device or method, whether it is used to conduct research or for
any other purpose.”).
192. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58 (proposing researchers be able to
use research tools in this situation, subject to a government-determined
royalty); Strandburg, supra note 174, at 142-46 (proposing the same, but only
after an initial five-year period of exclusivity). On the other hand, arriving at
the royalty would be difficult, particularly where multiple patents are
infringed (as when, for example, the researcher screens a library that contains
multiple patented DNA or protein products). See Mueller, supra note 174, at
63-66 (discussing the difficulties of determining the proper royalty rate, and
stating, “The determination of appropriate [royalty] rates can be a very
complex and expensive process”); Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1077
(discussing the same difficulties, for a different aspect of experimental use,
and stating, “Determination of reasonable royalties is never an easy task”).
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issued a report that subsequently led to a set of guidelines for
use of such tools at the NIH.193 The report provided the
following definition:
We use the term “research tool” in its broadest sense to embrace the
full range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory, while
recognizing that from other perspectives the same resources may be
viewed as “end products.” For our purposes, the term may thus
include cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models,
growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs and drug
targets, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory
equipment and machines, databases and computer software.194

Similarly, Judge Newman, in her dissent in Integra
Lifesciences, stated: “A research tool is a product or method
whose purpose is use in the conduct of research, whether the
tool is an analytical balance, an assay kit, a laser device (as in
Madey v. Duke University), or a biochemical method such as the
PCR (polymerase chain reaction).”195 Concern over the use of
these research tools in biotechnology has been the subject of
extensive recent commentary and analysis.196
However, the distinction between experimenting on the
patented invention and using the patented invention as a tool
for other research is not without its problems—in many cases,
drawing the line between the two types of uses is difficult.197
For example, a researcher may be performing research into a
193. See NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS (1998)
RESEARCH
TOOLS
REPORT],
available
at
[hereinafter
NIH
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/; see also Principles and Guidelines for
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and
Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg.
72090 (Dec. 23, 1999) [hereinafter NIH Research Tools Guidelines], available
at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090.pdf.
194. NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193 (Background section).
195. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
196. See generally, e.g., NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193;
NIH Research Tools Guidelines, supra note 193; Mireles, supra note 173;
Mueller, supra note 174; Ramirez, supra note 105.
197. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 114-15
(“[A]lthough it may seem relatively simple to distinguish use of a patented
invention to ‘see how it works’ or for the purpose of ‘improvement’ from use of
a patented research tool, it may be very difficult in practice.”); Eisenberg,
supra note 174, at 1084-86 (indirectly exploring the difficulty in making the
distinction regarding transgenic mice); cf. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at
878 (Newman, J., dissenting) (chiding the majority for misunderstanding the
distinction and therefore mischaracterizing the invention of the patents in
suit).
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particular pharmaceutical product. If the researcher needs
large quantities of the pharmaceutical, he or she may be
simultaneously refining a method for producing the
pharmaceutical product more efficiently and using the
resulting product in other experiments. If a step in the
production method is patented, is the researcher legitimately
experimenting “on” this step (as part of the refinement
research), or is he or she illegitimately using the step as a “tool”
for other research (because the step is used to produce a
product that is itself used for further research)? In this type of
situation, which is not uncommon, both arguments are equally
plausible. Thus, the necessary distinction between the two
types of uses is not always easy to make.
Cases involving the common law experimental use
exemption for researchers at academic institutions have not
actually arisen with much frequency. The exemption has
traditionally operated more informally, in that historically
academic scientists have patented their inventions only rarely,
and commercial patentees have sued academic researchers only
rarely.198 The modern emphasis on extracting the full value
from patents, coupled with the increase of profit-motivated
research in universities in response to Bayh-Dole, is causing a
shift in this behavior, and so experimental use has taken on
more importance recently.199
The Federal Circuit has generally viewed the common law
experimental use exemption with grave suspicion, reading the
exemption narrowly.
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar
Pharmaceutical Co.,200 a generic drug company argued that its
research and testing on a patented drug prior to the expiration
of the patent, with the goal of releasing a generic equivalent of
the drug immediately upon expiration of the patent, qualified
for the experimental use exemption.201 The court disagreed,
holding that this research and testing was for commercial
purposes and was therefore an infringement of Roche’s
patent.202 Although Congress later overruled the specific
198. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 35 (“The
strength and contours of the defense have not been fully tested; as several
panelists testified, corporations typically have not sued universities.”).
199. See Dreyfuss, supra note 174, at 457-61 (exploring the reasons for this
shift).
200. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
201. See id. at 860, 862.
202. See id. at 863 (“[W]e hold the experimental use exception to be truly
narrow, and we will not expand it under the present circumstances. . . . Bolar’s
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holding in Roche by creating a special statutory exemption for
infringements that are “solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs”
(that is, research related to the FDA drug approval process),203
it did not address the common law experimental use exemption
as a general proposition. Later, in his concurrence in Embrex,
Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,204 Judge Rader stated flatly
that the common law experimental use exemption no longer
existed: “[N]either the statute nor any past Supreme Court
precedent gives any reason to excuse infringement because it
was committed with a particular purpose or intent, such as for
scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”205
More recently, the Federal Circuit considered the common
law research exemption in Madey v. Duke University.206 John
Madey was a researcher at Duke who had a patent (granted
before he was hired by Duke) on a laser that was useful for
certain research applications.207 Madey subsequently left Duke
after a series of disputes over his position,208 yet even after his
departure, Duke continued to use his laser, without a license,
to complete work under various government grants.209 In
response, Madey sued Duke for patent infringement.210 As a
defense, Duke asserted that its use was entirely experimental,
and therefore its infringement should be excused.211 The
Federal Circuit declined to allow the exemption.212 More
importantly, it expressed its holding in very broad language
that severely narrowed (if not destroyed) the exemption, taking
“philosophical” in its narrow modern sense of esoteric inquiry

intended ‘experimental’ use is solely for business reasons and not for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry . . .
[and] is thus an infringement of the ’053 patent.”).
203. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000). The Federal Circuit has also interpreted
this exemption narrowly. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331
F.3d 860, 865-68 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
204. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
205. Id. at 1353 (Rader, J., concurring).
206. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
207. See id. at 1352.
208. See id. at 1352-53.
209. See id. at 1353-54.
210. See id. at 1353.
211. See id. at 1360-63.
212. See id. at 1362-63.
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rather than its historic sense of science generally:213
[R]egardless of whether a particular institution or entity is engaged
in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is in
furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business and is not
solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow and
strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover, the profit or
non-profit status of the user is not determinative.214

Shortly after Madey, the common law exemption arose
again in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA.215 On its
face, Merck involved interpretation of the statutory exemption
for research relating to the FDA drug approval process
contained in 35 U.S.C. §271(e), and how far back into the
Indeed, the
research process the exemption extended.216
majority opinion of the Federal Circuit specifically stated that
the common law experimental use exemption was not at
issue.217 However, Judge Newman dissented, contending that
the §271(e) exemption extended back to the point at which the
common law experimental use exemption ended, and thus all of
Integra’s conduct was covered under one or the other
exemption.218 She also used the opportunity to attack the
broad language of Madey regarding the common law
exemption, characterizing the breadth of the Madey holding as
unnecessary dicta.219 In her view, Madey involved using a
research tool for its intended purpose (that is, facilitating
research into other areas), which should be an infringement not
implicating the common law experimental use exemption.220
The common law exemption should apply only to further
research into the thing patented, for purposes of improving on
or designing around the patent.221 Thus, Madey’s language
attacking the foundation of the common law experimental use
exemption was unnecessary. The Supreme Court subsequently
reversed the Federal Circuit’s narrow reading of the statutory
exemption, expanding its coverage to a broader range of

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
See id. at 864-68 (concluding that the answer was “not very far”).
See id. at 863 n.2.
See id. at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
See id. at 878 n.10.
See id.
See id.
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research relating to FDA drug approval.222 However, the
Supreme Court’s opinion did not address the scope of the
common law research exemption.223
Despite the Federal Circuit’s current reluctance to apply it,
the experimental use exemption plays an important role in
facilitating research, and so it should be implemented in at
least a limited way.
4. Patent Pools
Another way to accommodate the conflicting exclusionary
rights in a complex technology is with a patent pool. In a
patent pool, individual patentees assign their patents to a
single collective entity in exchange for license to use the other
222. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2383-84
(2005).
223. Several commentators who favor a broad experimental use exemption
filed amicus briefs urging the Court not to address the issue in this case. See
Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Intellectual Property Law Association in
Support of Neither Party at 22-24, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237) (“The question presented by the
petitioner does not implicate the scope of the common-law exception, and in
any event the facts of this case do not raise the issue. AIPLA therefore urges
this Court not to consider the scope and nuances of the common-law doctrine
as part of its review.”); Brief of Intellectual Property Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 15-21, Merck KGaA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005) (No. 03-1237) (“Th[is] case therefore
does not provide a good opportunity for the Court to determine the reach of the
traditional experimental use exemption. There are, however, important
reasons for the Court to state explicitly that any decision in this case does not
foreclose the assertion of the traditional experimental use exemption.”).
However, other parties favoring the exemption requested that the Court
consider the issue. See Brief of Amici Curiae Consumer Project on Technology,
Electronic Frontier Foundation & Public Knowledge in Support of Petitioner
at 24-30, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005)
(No. 03-1237) [hereinafter EFF Amicus Brief] (“It is critically important that
the Court take this opportunity to correct the Federal Circuit’s improperly
narrow interpretations of the experimental use exception in Roche, Embrex,
Madey, and this case.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae Bar Association of the District
of Columbia — Patent, Trademark & Copyright Section in Support of Neither
Party at passim, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372
(2005) (No. 03-1237) (“An experimental use exemption is recognized either by
statute or by common law in developed countries and is fundamentally
necessary to foster innovation. Failure to recognize this important exemption
to infringement will deter research in the United States and encourage
companies to conduct their research and development off-shore.”). The
various briefs from the case are available on Dennis Crouch’s Patently-O Blog,
at http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/02/merck_kgaa_stat.html (last
visited Aug. 12, 2005).
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patents in the pool.224 Patent pools typically charge royalties
and then redistribute the royalties to their members according
to an agreed formula.225 Although these royalty payments can
be very important, in many instances the main function of a
patent pool is to provide access to the patents in the pool, not to
make money directly.226
Historically, patent pools have arisen in such industries as
the early airplane and automobile industries, where a few
competing manufacturers held overlapping patents that
blocked each other and thus prevented any of the
manufacturers from making any products.227 These blocking
problems were often resolved with patent pools.228 More
recently, patent pools have been used to resolve blocking
situations that were preventing deployment of the MPEG-2
video
compression
format
and
DVD-video/DVD-ROM
formats.229 Indeed, a patent pool has been repeatedly proposed
as a solution to the similar blocking problems that are arising
in the biotechnology area.230 Many of the historical patent
224. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1340-42.
225. See id. at 1341-42.
226. See, e.g., id. at 1344 (“[In the airplane patent pool,] most licensing was
conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement
suits as the real payment for the exchange.”); id. at 1346 (“As with the
[airplane pool], most members of the automobile pool seemed content to rely
on the blanket, royalty-free cross licensing that was also available under the
pool.”).
227. See id. at 1340-47; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 888-91 (1990)
(discussing the impact of patents on the development of the automobile and
airplane industries).
228. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1340-47.
229. See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
PATENTS?
4-5
(2000),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
230. See, e.g., id. at 8-11; David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, J. PHIL., SCI. & L. (Jan. 23, 2003),
http://www.miami.edu/ethics/jpsl/archives/papers/biotechPatent.html;
Lawrence M. Sung & Don. J. Pelto, Greater Predictability May Result in
Patent Pools: As the Federal Circuit Refines Scope of Biotech Claims, Use of
Collective Rights Becomes Likely, NAT’L L.J., June 22, 1998, at C2. This
proposal dates back at least as far as 1983. See Stanford, California Push
Patent-Pool—With Caution, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, Mar. 21, 1983, at 5
(discussing a proposed patent pool for basic biotechnology research tools). Not
everyone supports this proposal, however. See Bradley J. Levang, Comment,
Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools for Biotechnology: A Refutation to the
USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 229 (2002).
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pools, however, ultimately required government intervention to
get the pool started.231 To date, no comprehensive patent pools
have arisen in the biotechnology field.
II. BAYH-DOLE: PRIOR CRITICISM AND PROPOSED
SOLUTION
The Bayh-Dole Act has been, in the estimation of many,
very successful in getting more government-funded inventions
into private hands so they can be developed for the use of the
public. The Bayh-Dole Act has also been the subject of
substantial criticism. And as with any criticized statute,
suggestions for its reform abound. This Section focuses on one
particular criticism and proposed reform.
A. THE CRITICS: RAI AND EISENBERG
In their article Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of
Biomedicine,232 Professors Rai and Eisenberg express
dissatisfaction with the current implementation of the BayhDole Act and propose a solution that, while perhaps appealing
in the abstract, is unworkable in practice. Professors Rai and
Eisenberg appear to accept the basic premise behind the BayhDole Act—that is, some inventions created with federal funds
will not be developed into products without a patent.233
However, they also point out that many other federally funded
inventions will still be developed, or in fact do not need further
development, even in the absence of a patent.234 In the latter
cases, the patent is unnecessary and only imposes a tax on
future research, or in some cases even blocks such future
research.235 Their primary concern is that the current Act
creates a heavy bias in favor of patenting all inventions,
whether such patenting advances development of the invention,
or merely imposes a tax or erects a block.236
231. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1356-57 & n.226 (discussing formation
of the aircraft and synthetic rubber research patent pools at the behest of the
government, triggered by entry in to World War I and II, respectively).
232. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9.
233. See id. at 302-03. They cite as an example the machines that have
been developed for rapid DNA sequencing. See id. But see Eisenberg, supra
note 1 (expressing deep skepticism about Bayh-Dole and its rationale).
234. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 291, 303.
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As an example, they cite the Cohen-Boyer patent on basic
recombinant DNA techniques.237 The research leading to this
patent, which covered technology fundamental to the
biotechnology industry, was conducted with government
funding, and once created, the invention required no further
development.238 The employers of the researchers, Stanford
University and the University of California, patented the
invention anyway, and then widely licensed the patent
nonexclusively at a low royalty rate to anyone who requested a
license.239 Thus, the patent on the techniques offered no
incentive effects at all—the spread of the invention would have
been the same if it had been dedicated to the public domain.
The patent served only to bring in revenue to the universities,
at the cost of imposing a tax on essentially all biotechnology
research.240
Such a tax on research is, however, only part of the
problem. The Cohen-Boyer patent was at least licensed widely
and with relatively few restrictions.241 Professors Rai and
Eisenberg express concern over fundamental patents similar to
Cohen-Boyer that are not licensed to all comers, but are instead
kept exclusive.242 Such patents have the potential to block
large areas of research, severely limiting their further
development. As an example, the authors discuss the current
state of research into human embryonic stem cells.243 And even
when the patentee is amenable to licensing, the licensing may
not take place, for a variety of reasons.244 Even when licensing
does eventually take place, the costs and delays in reaching the
agreement will have an adverse impact on the research
237. See id. at 300-01.
238. Id. at 300.
239. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 41
(1997); Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300.
240. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300. But see Ramirez, supra
note 105, at 376 (“The Cohen-Boyer patent is a positive example of the benefits
of patenting research tools.”).
241. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 300.
242. See id. at 301.
243. See id. at 301. Indeed, their concern that research into these
embryonic stem cells will be (or already has been) blocked seems to be the
driving force behind their proposal. See id. at 292-93, 296, 301-02, 309-10,
313.
244. See id. at 297-98. Some of the reasons for bargaining breakdown and
how this breakdown may lead to an “anticommons” are discussed in more
detail supra Part I.B.2.
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enterprise.245
These disadvantages may occur with either category of
invention, those that would have been developed without a
patent and those that would not have been developed. If the
invention would not have been developed without the patent,
then these disadvantages may simply be acceptable costs of the
system.246 When the invention would have been developed
anyway, however, then these disadvantages simply become
drags on the research system, with no concomitant benefit.247
The primary concern of Professors Rai and Eisenberg is that
the current Act strongly favors patents, making no distinction
between the two categories. Thus, many important inventions
are being unnecessarily locked up by patents, creating needless
costs and blocks to the research enterprise.248
B. THEIR PROPOSED SOLUTION
To address this problem, Professors Rai and Eisenberg
propose giving the NIH the duty of analyzing each funding
agreement it makes to determine into which category any
resulting invention will fit, and then basing the decision to
award or deny the funding recipient the right to seek patents
If an invention needs further
on this determination.249
development, then the inventor should be permitted to seek a
patent for it (and this should be the presumptive route). If,
however, the invention is fundamental and needs no further
development, or such development would proceed even without
a patent, then the inventor should not be permitted to seek a
patent for it.250
Professors Rai and Eisenberg then explore the mechanisms
in the current Bayh-Dole Act by which the NIH might exercise
such power.251 They first look to 35 U.S.C. §202(a)(ii), which
provides that the agency may, “in exceptional circumstances . .
245. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 297.
246. See id. at 302-03 (discussing situations where patenting is justified).
247. See id. at 300-02 (discussing situations where patenting is not
justified).
248. See id. at 300-03.
249. See id. at 303-310 (discussing why NIH is the appropriate body for
making this determination); id. at 310-13 (discussing how to give NIH this
authority).
250. See id. at 310-11.
251. Id. at 310-13.
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. determin[e] . . . that restriction or elimination of the right to
retain title to any subject invention will better promote the
policy and objectives of this chapter.”252 Thus, if the agency
determines that the inventions likely arising from research
under a proposed funding agreement would be better developed
if they were not patented, the agency can draft the funding
agreement to prevent the researcher from patenting any
resulting inventions. While this provision would seem ideally
suited to their purposes, the authors note that in fact it is an
unwieldy tool.253 First, the term “exceptional circumstances”
suggests that this section should be applied only on rare
occasions; it should not be a routine part of the funding
decision.254 Second, use of the provision carries with it the
requirement that the agency follow specific procedures
designed to protect the rights of the funding recipient. These
procedures include “an elaborate administrative procedure for
challenging such determinations, with a right of appeal to the
United States Claims Court.”255 Any time an agency makes
such a determination, it must also notify the Commerce
Department and provide a detailed analysis justifying the
decision.256 These limitations make this provision unsuitable
for routine use, including the purpose envisioned by the
authors.257
Professors Rai and Eisenberg next consider using the
funding agency’s “march-in” powers to compel licensing of
university patents.258 However, they conclude that, although
these powers are not limited by the “exceptional circumstances”
requirement, they are similarly unsuitable for the authors’
purposes because they are subject to similar procedural
hurdles:259 The rights may be exercised only for the very
narrow reasons set forth in the statute, and the procedure is
extremely slow because the actual transfer of rights to other
parties is deferred until the completion of elaborate
252. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a)(ii) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
253. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 310.
254. See id. at 293, 310.
255. Id. at 293.
256. See id. at 293 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(b)(1)).
257. See id. at 310; see also id. at 294 n.28 (noting that NIH has only
declared exceptional circumstances in one case of which the authors are
aware).
258. See id. at 294, 311 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 203). March-in under Bayh-Dole
is discussed supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
259. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 294.
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administrative proceedings and subsequent court appeals.260
The authors further note that the NIH has never used the
march-in right.261 Thus, they conclude that the existing
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act are unsuitable for their
purposes.
To address these problems with the existing Bayh-Dole
regime, Professors Rai and Eisenberg propose two “modest
reforms.”262 First, they propose that “the circumstances in
which an agency may depart from the statutory presumption
that the [funding recipient] may retain title to an invention in
the terms of particular grants should be liberalized” by deleting
the “exceptional circumstances” language.263 According to the
authors:
Once the “exceptional circumstances” language is deleted, the
substantive standard set forth in the current statutory language,
which permits departure from the usual rule “when it is determined
by the agency that restriction or elimination of the right to retain title
to any subject invention will better promote the policy and objectives
of this chapter,” could be more freely applied to achieve the legislative
goal of promoting widespread dissemination and use of research
results.264

They also propose streamlining the existing administrative
review process and allowing infringing research to proceed
while the agency and courts conduct their respective reviews.265
Second, the authors propose to modify the march-in right,
removing the requirement that the government hold the
authority in abeyance until the parties exhaust all court
appeals. They argue that this requirement, with its inherent
delays, is in conflict with the time-sensitive substantive
reasons for which march-in is permitted, such as achieving
practical application of the invention within a “reasonable
time” and “alleviat[ing] health or safety needs.”266 They note,
however, that judicial review should be preserved for these
march-in cases, as the post-issuance exercise of march-in rights
“disturbs settled expectations of grantees and licensees that
may underlie investments,” which could lead to industry
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 203(a), (b)).
See id. & n.35.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id.
Id. at 311 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1), (2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
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“becom[ing]
wary
of
investing
in
university-based
technology.”267
Armed with these two reforms, Professors Rai and
Eisenberg believe, the NIH can determine which inventions
should be patented and which should not, and control its
funding recipients accordingly.
C. CRITIQUE OF THE SOLUTION
One initial critique of this solution is that the view
Professors Rai and Eisenberg take is a narrow one. After all,
after the fact one can always point to patented inventions,
government-funded or not, that would have been developed
even without the patent incentive. Rather, what is important
is the overall effect on the technology transfer/invention
development system of having patents available in the first
place. Instead of viewing it as a failure, the success of CohenBoyer should be seen as a victory for the Bayh-Dole Act. The
revenue made by Stanford and the University of California has
made researchers and institutions much more aware of the
value of watching for patented technology and getting it out of
the labs, thereby serving the ultimate goals of Bayh-Dole.268
Furthermore, revenue from university-owned patents often
goes toward funding more research, reducing the need for
government funding269 and thereby funding research by taxing
those using the technology, rather than the population in
general.270
267. Id.
268. See Ramirez, supra note 105, at 376 (arguing that after Cohen-Boyer,
“inventors and universities recognized the benefits of making the technology
broadly available”); cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1712 (“Of course,
universities would have no reason to cooperate in technology transfer on a
royalty-free basis . . . .”).
269. According to Professor Thomas Massaro at the University of Virginia
School of Medicine:
It has become very logical—and in fact very necessary—for
research universities to more aggressively seek the profits that may
be generated through patents, licenses, and royalties. In this cashdry environment, universities are enamored with the possibility of
generating new revenues by commercializing the products of their
research. We are trying to use the proceeds from the “downstream”
results of research to feed back “upstream” research itself.
Massaro, supra note 5, at 1734.
270. Professor Massaro continues:
To the extent that universities are successful in feeding the
“upstream” with “downstream” revenues, society is well served. The
Bayh-Dole legislation's superordinate goals of getting new ideas into
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However, the basic hypothesis advanced by Professors Rai
and Eisenberg has merit: The Act provides important
incentives for getting many inventions developed, but some
inventions would have been developed even without the
incentives of the Bayh-Dole Act, and such inventions should be
made more widely available.271 Nevertheless, their proposed
solution—requiring the NIH to determine in advance which
funding agreements will result in inventions that should be
patented and which will result in inventions that should not be
patented, and to act accordingly—is unworkable, for a variety
of reasons.272
The basis of their proposal is that Congress should delete
the “exceptional circumstances” language from §202(a)(ii),
thereby giving the NIH broader discretion to determine
whether each individual funding agreement should or should
not permit the funding recipient to seek patents on any
resulting inventions. If the agency decides that the funding
agreement will result in an invention (or inventions) that needs
the Act’s incentives for further development, the agreement
should permit the funding recipient to obtain patents and grant
exclusive licenses to the patents. If instead the agency decides
that the funding agreement will result in an invention (or
inventions) that will be better developed and used without the
incentives, the agreement should require the funding recipients
to forego patenting, and the invention should be dedicated to
the public. However, the NIH (and other federal agencies) had
exactly that discretion prior to Bayh-Dole, and their reluctance
to permit funding recipients to obtain patents and grant
the marketplace is being met. . . . [Professor Eisenberg] suggests that
from the point of view of the consumer, royalties paid to the
university are just another tax. Of course at one level this is true. A
more realistic view is that universities are government contract
laboratories distinguished by the efficiency with which they can help
defray their operating overhead by a form of “user fees.” Such
royalty-derived user fees align the incentives of society and the
university research community better than most other mechanisms in
the sense that such fees are paid by a defined group that in principle
benefits from the good (university research) more than the general
public.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
271. Indeed, the Harbridge House report identified exactly this same issue
thirty-five years earlier. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
272. It must be noted that Professors Rai and Eisenberg do address many
of the criticisms discussed in this part. However, they underestimate the
actual difficulties they do address, and fail to consider others.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028852

2006]

SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE

437

licenses (especially exclusive licenses) is what led to the
passage of the Act in the first place.273 The authors address
this criticism, arguing that the tide has turned in the last
twenty-five years and that the NIH now understands and
embraces its role in technology transfer.274 Although that may
be true in the short term, it is entirely plausible that the NIH,
freed from the shackles of Bayh-Dole, will eventually revert to
its old instincts and again become reluctant to allow funding
recipients to obtain patents and grant exclusive licenses.275
A more fundamental question is that of institutional
competence.
Simply put, will the NIH be any good at
determining which funding agreements will result in
inventions that should be patented (because they need further
development) and which will result in inventions that should
273. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the history of the Bayh-Dole Act).
274. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 311.
275. Indeed, history suggests that the NIH might well do exactly that. As
noted supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text, one of the events that led to
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was that HEW (the agency that then had
authority over the NIH), after ten years of stability, began reconsidering its
licensing policies. To quote Professor Eisenberg:
Apparently the immediate trigger for introduction of the BayhDole bill was frustration on the part of universities with changes in
the way HEW and DoD handled patent rights in their inventions.
The change at HEW followed a relatively harmonious decade after the
agency responded in the late 1960s to sharp criticism from the
General Accounting Office of its handling of patent rights in the NIH
medicinal chemistry program. The agency response was to allow
universities with approved technology transfer capabilities to retain
title to patents and to grant exclusive licenses to industry under the
terms of Institutional Patent Agreements (“IPAs”). IPAs conferred
rights in universities on a prospective basis, without the need for
case-by-case requests for a government waiver after an invention had
been made, thereby eliminating uncertainty and bureaucratic delays
for universities that sought patent rights.
Then, in a 1978 draft report, HEW’s Office of General Counsel
recommended that use of IPAs be reconsidered on the ground that
they encourage exclusive licensing and thereby limit the agency’s
control over the availability and cost of HEW-supported inventions.
Around the same time, the HEW general counsel’s office began taking
longer to review case-by-case requests for a waiver of government
patent rights after inventions had been made. These developments
caused concern that HEW might be reverting to its pre-1968 policies
and created pressure for legislation that would make permanent and
nondiscretionary the arrangements that the agency had previously
implemented on a discretionary basis.
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1691-92 (footnotes omitted); cf. Heller & Eisenberg,
supra note 132, at 700 (“[A] politically accountable government agency such as
NIH may further its public health mission by using its intellectual property
rights to ensure widespread availability of new therapeutic products at
reasonable prices.”).
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not (because they do not need such development)? After all, the
NIH is an institution established for the advancement of
scientific knowledge, through direct research of its own and
Most of the
funding of other researchers nationwide.276
personnel consist of current or former research scientists who
are not versed in the arcana of the invention-development
literature. The skills needed to perform or to manage the
funding of basic scientific research are quite different from
those needed to make the very subtle determination of whether
a particular discovery will be better developed with exclusive
rights.277 Professors Rai and Eisenberg do suggest that the
NIH could employ policy experts on innovation to help with this
problem,278 but a handful of experts cannot overcome the
institutional deficiency of the NIH personnel as a whole.
Furthermore, all those people at the NIH already have jobs
to do—and so who, exactly, will make these patenting
determinations? Even if funding could be found to hire some
new personnel for this purpose, it is unlikely to be sufficient to
the task. Ann Roberson, the former president of the University
of Tennessee Research Corporation, calculates that it would
require an “army” of at least 1000 new employees to do the job
properly.279 However, the NIH is unlikely to receive funding to
hire even one-tenth that number, even assuming such a
number of qualified people actually existed and desired the job.
The result will be a cadre of overworked analysts and a pile of
underanalyzed funding agreements—not a formula likely to
bring about the desired result.280
276. See National Insts. of Health, Questions and Answers About NIH,
http://www.nih.gove/about/FAQs.htm#NIH (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
277. Professors Rai and Eisenberg do spend considerable time justifying
this role for the NIH. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 303-310.
However, they discuss only NIH as an institution, not the individual people
who make up the institution. The people are the ones who will ultimately
need to make the relevant determinations, not the “institution.”
278. See id. at 312.
279. Personal Communication from Ann Roberson, Former President,
Univ. of Tenn. Research Corp. (Feb. 10, 2004). In an interview, Dr. Mark
Rohrbaugh, Director of the Office of Technology Transfer at the National
Institutes of Health, seconded this view, at least in principal. Telephone
Interview with Dr. Mark Rohrbaugh, Director, Office of Tech. Transfer,
National Insts. of Health (Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Rohrbaugh Interview].
280. Indeed, this is the very situation that plagues the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO)—too few personnel to handle the amount of work,
meaning that examiners are rarely able to invest the time required to do a
proper patentability analysis on each application. Thus, the PTO is routinely
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Finally, there is the issue of institutional bias: What will
be the tendencies of the NIH when deciding what gets patented
and what does not? Professors Rai and Eisenberg discuss the
public choice model in this context, noting that skeptics might
fear that “our proposal would tempt agencies like NIH to use
their discretion to justify an allocation of greater resources to
expand their own roles,” using “ostensibly public-spirited
arguments for public funding as a means of promoting
widespread access to research results, when in fact these
arguments would cover self-serving efforts to expand the scope
of its own research, even in research areas where the private
sector is already operating.”281 They dismiss the concern,
however, noting that the “public-spirited arguments” may well
be persuasive in this context, even if their underlying source is
simply the agency trying to enhance its power.282 They do not,
however, address what happens when the arguments are not
persuasive and the agency makes decisions that are entirely
self-serving based on pretextual “public-spirited arguments.”
Furthermore, this argument would seem to undercut the entire
rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act—if these “public-spirited
arguments” are so persuasive, then why does the Act require
the opposite result? If Professors Rai and Eisenberg truly
believe this argument, then they should be arguing for the
abolition of the Act, not its fine-tuning.283
A related concern about bias arises upon considering how
the NIH is comprised. As noted above, most of the people at
the NIH are scientists or former scientists, and as a
consequence they largely share a particular ethos. Both
Professor Eisenberg and Professor Rai have written about the
“norms of science” that lead scientists to view their work as a
piece of a larger endeavor to understand the world.284 This
criticized for the poor quality of many of the patents it issues. See, e.g.,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 46-63 (chapter entitled
“Seven Criteria for Evaluating the Patent System: Ensuring High-Quality
Patents”); id. at 51-52 (subchapter entitled “Workload Pressures on the
USPTO”).
281. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 311-12.
282. See id. at 312.
283. Cf. generally Eisenberg, supra note 1 (attacking the underpinnings of
Bayh-Dole and creating the impression that she would not be adverse to
abolishing it, at least insofar as it covers universities and related nonprofit
entities).
284. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science
in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987); Arti K. Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94
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view leads them to favor widespread sharing of results,
techniques, and reagents, and to view proprietary rights with
great skepticism.285 Given the power to decide what should and
should not be patented, these scientists are likely to show a
bias toward finding that funding recipients should not be
permitted to patent their inventions, in an attempt to move the
scientific enterprise away from its modern emphasis on
proprietary rights and bring it back to these norms of free
sharing.
The authors also note the danger that “funding agencies
such as NIH might use their expanded discretion over
patenting decisions to respond to political pressures unrelated
to the legitimate goal of mediating the tension between access
and product development,” particularly in controversial areas
such as research involving human embryos.286 Unable to
dismiss this concern, they express the hope that judicial review
of agency decisions will restrain this type of conduct.287 Given
the extreme deference courts must give to discretionary agency
decisions such as these that are highly fact-dependent and rely
heavily on agency expertise,288 that hope seems wildly
optimistic at best.
All of these problems are significant practical hurdles to
the proposed review mechanism. However, the fundamental
issue is whether anyone can make the kind of determinations
required by the proposal. Even assuming that the NIH hires a
large number of people who are experts in the field, who can
overcome any institutional biases and political pressure, and
NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) [hereinafter Rai, Norms of Science]. Not everyone
agrees with this picture of the scientific enterprise. See F. Scott Kieff,
Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 (2001)
(arguing this view of science is too abstract to be of use in setting patent
policy). But see Arti K. Rai, Evolving Scientific Norms and Intellectual
Property Rights: A Reply to Kieff, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 707 (2001) (countering
Kieff by arguing that scientific norms are instructive in encouraging patents).
285. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 284; Rai, Norms of Science, supra
note 284. This description is a vast oversimplification of a much more
nuanced argument.
286. Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 313.
287. See id.
288. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (setting out standards of review of agency
actions under the Administrative Procedure Act); Chevron USA, Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984) (expounding the
“Chevron doctrine” of deference to administrative agencies).
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who have the best intentions of implementing the proposed
scheme perfectly, can these experts make the correct decisions?
The proposed reform requires in effect a two-step ex ante
analysis at the time a funding agreement is drafted: (1) Predict
what invention or inventions will be created under the funding
agreement, and then (2) predict whether any such postulated
invention(s) will be better developed with a patent or without
one. Given the high frequency with which the actual direction
of a research project diverges from the initial planned direction,
even the first prognostication step is fraught with difficulty.
The second, more difficult step then requires looking further
into the future and predicting the course of development of the
postulated invention and of subsequent inventions that might
derive from the postulated invention. However, in all but the
most obvious cases, this latter determination is almost
impossible to make.289 Even a cursory glance at the invention
development literature reveals both the wide range of
viewpoints on the process of development and the lack of
consensus of what will and will not lead to optimum
development of inventions.290 Even in hindsight, determining
whether a patent facilitated or hindered the development of an
invention can be exceedingly difficult; making such a
determination in advance promises to be almost impossible.
Combining the two predictive steps makes an accurate
determination virtually unattainable.
For these reasons, the Rai and Eisenberg proposal would
289. In a footnote, the authors appear to acknowledge this difficulty, but
they have very little to say about its solution; indeed, the footnote only
compares making ex ante decisions with making ex post decisions:
To be sure, action ex ante may be problematic to the extent that it
may sometimes be difficult to determine at the outset whether
particular research is best distributed broadly or under a regime of
property rights. As discussed in the text, however, action ex post is
problematic to the extent that it may disturb settled expectations of
grantees and licensees.
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 310-11, n.114.
290. See generally, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 227 and references
cited therein; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen Merrill eds., 2003); Manfredi
La Manna et al., The Case for Permissive Patents, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 1427
(1989); Suzanne Scotchmer, Patents as an Incentive System, in ECONOMICS IN
A CHANGING WORLD, VOL. 2: MICROECONOMICS (PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION—
MOSCOW) 281 (Beth Allen ed., 1996); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29 (1991).
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fail in implementation. However, the goal that they advance is
a desirable one, and so this Article proposes an alternative
reform of the Bayh-Dole Act.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
A. THE PROPOSAL
To better implement the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act, the
focus should shift from the potential patentee and his or her
invention (the target of the proposed reform of Professors Rai
and Eisenberg and many others) to the other end of the
equation: the users of the technology.
The primary concern of Bayh-Dole critics, including
Professors Rai and Eisenberg, tends to be the effect of the Act
on research that is deemed basic or fundamental. Such
fundamental research is typically susceptible to wide
application in many avenues of further exploration, by a wide
variety of other researchers who are also doing basic
research.291 In the United States, such basic research is
primarily carried out by researchers using government
funding.292 Thus, most of the basic research that concerns the
critics will have government funding.
Conversely, the
government does not, as a rule, fund truly commercial
development.293 The commercial development that causes the
critics less concern will therefore likely not have government
funding. Categorizing the research as government-funded or
non-government-funded thus serves as a rough proxy for the
two categories of research that concern the critics.
The basic proposal is this: All researchers whose work is
supported by federal funds should have a limited, royalty-free
license to make and use for research purposes all inventions
developed with federal funds.294 Such a system would address
many of the problems identified by the critics, including
291. Indeed, with true breakthrough discoveries, the original inventor may
be incapable of investigating all the avenues that the research opens up, or
even imagining what all of those avenues are.
292. See,
e.g.,
National
Insts.
of
Health,
About
NIH,
http://www.nih.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).
293. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1663-64.
294. The license should not extend to the right to sell or otherwise
commercialize the patented invention for reasons discussed infra Part
III.C.2.a.
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Professors Rai and Eisenberg. Since all government-funded
researchers (that is, most basic researchers) would have a
license to all government-funded patents, then almost all of
those who need access to the basic technology covered by these
patents will have it.
Conversely, non-government-funded
researchers (that is, commercial researchers) would still need
to license the patents, as is proper for commercial enterprises.
This solution does not suffer from the indicated drawbacks of
Professors Rai and Eisenberg’s proposed reform, and it would
also be at least a partial implementation of other proposed
reforms of patent law designed to solve other problems
currently affecting this field of law.
One of the main advantages of such a solution is its
simplicity: It puts fundamental inventions in the hands of most
basic researchers without the need to have anyone review each
funding agreement or to have a court battle over whether an
invention should be patented or dedicated to the public domain.
Moreover, it does not require that a particular research project
be characterized as “basic” or “applied” (or with a related
labeling scheme)—a distinction required in the implementation
of many experimental use exemption proposals, but one that is
often virtually impossible to make in practice. Instead, the
only question is whether the research is funded by the
government or not, a fact that is easily ascertained.
This proposal also provides at least a partial answer to one
aspect of the “double paying” problem.295 As noted above, one
of the lingering concerns over Bayh-Dole is that it forces the
public to pay twice for inventions funded by the government:
once when they subsidize the research with tax dollars and
again when they must pay royalties on the patented invention.
The broad argument is ultimately unpersuasive, since the real
choice is between paying once and getting nothing, or paying
twice and getting the innovation. However, the idea behind the
argument has more force in the particular context of the
government spending tax dollars to develop an invention, then
spending more tax dollars (in the form of royalties) to use the
invention in subsequent research it funds. If researchers
funded by the government have a royalty-free license to use all
government-developed technology for research purposes, then
this second payment is eliminated.
As an example of the effect of the proposed license,
295. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
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consider the case of human embryonic stem cells.296 Most cells
in the human body are “differentiated,” meaning that they have
developed in a way that enables them to perform a very specific
task.297 Skin cells, blood cells, muscle cells, and nerve cells are
all examples of differentiated cells.298 Stem cells, in contrast,
are undifferentiated, and therefore retain the ability to become
more than one type of differentiated cell.299 For example, blood
stem cells (actually bone marrow stem cells) retain the ability
to differentiate into a variety of types of blood cells, including
red blood cells, white blood cells, and platelets.300 The stem
cells in adults are of this type, retaining the ability to
differentiate into a limited number of related differentiated
cells.301 The embryonic stem cell, however, retains the ability
to differentiate into any type of cell found in the body.302 In
addition, most cells taken from the body have a very limited
lifetime in tissue culture. Embryonic stem cells, on the other
hand, can persist for a very long time in culture, which
facilitates their study and use.303 Scientists believe that this
ability to persist in culture for a long time and then
differentiate into any type of body cell makes embryonic stem
cells ideally suited for use in treating a wide variety of
diseases.304 “Stem cells, directed to differentiate into specific
cell types, offer the possibility of a renewable source of
replacement cells and tissues to treat diseases including
Parkinson’s and Alzheimer’s diseases, spinal cord injury,
stroke, burns, heart disease, diabetes, osteoarthritis, and
rheumatoid arthritis.”305 Embryonic stem cells may also be
useful for screening new drugs and toxins, and understanding

296. As indicated above, access to these stem cells seems to be one of the
primary concerns of Professors Rai and Eisenberg. See supra note 243. See
generally Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9.
297. See National Insts. of Health, Stem Cell Information: Stem Cell Basics
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/basics/StemCellBasics.pdf
(last
updated Sept. 2002).
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id. In scientific terms, embryonic stem cells are said to be
“pluripotent.” Id.
303. See id.
304. See id.
305. Id.
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birth defects.306
Human embryonic stem cells were first isolated in 1998 by
a team of researchers led by Dr. James Thomson at the
University of Wisconsin–Madison.307 In earlier work supported
by funding from the NIH, these researchers had isolated
embryonic stem cells from rhesus monkeys and macaques.308
Based on these primate lines and pursuant to the Bayh-Dole
Act, the university obtained a patent on primate embryonic
stem cells—which included human embryonic stem cells.309 At
the time, a moratorium was in place on federal funding of
research into human embryonic stem cells, and so the
researchers’ further research into human embryonic stem cells
was supported by Geron Corporation.310 After the researchers
successfully used the techniques developed with NIH funding
to isolate human embryonic stem cells, they obtained a patent
particularly claiming these cells as well.311 Rather than license
the patent broadly, the university licensed many of the most
important uses exclusively to Geron.312 This exclusive license
gave Geron a potential stranglehold over much of the research
involving human embryonic stem cells, with the power to
determine who could perform even basic research with them.313
As a consequence, many basic researchers desiring to research
various aspects of the near-limitless uses of stem cells were at
the mercy of Geron.314
306. See id. at 3. For a thorough discussion of the science of stem cells, see
NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
(2001),
available
at
http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/info/scireport/PDFs/fullrptstem.pdf.
307. See NATIONAL INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 306, at ES-4.
308. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 293 n.23.
309. See id. (citing Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent No.
5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996)).
310. See id. at 293 n.23, 301.
311. See id. at 293 n.23 (citing Primate Embryonic Stem Cells, U.S. Patent
No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998)).
312. The funding agreement in fact required that Geron receive an
exclusive license to these areas. See id. at 301. The licensed uses were to six
types of differentiated cells derived from embryonic stem cells: neural cells,
heart cells, pancreatic islet cells (which produce insulin), bone cells, blood cells
and cartilage cells. See Andrew Pollack, University Resolves Dispute on Stem
Cell Patent License, N.Y. TIMES Jan. 10, 2002, at C11.
313. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 301 (“Exclusive licenses on
research tools with potentially broad applications threaten to throttle
scientific progress by limiting the number of players in a developing field.”).
314. The NIH was also concerned over this degree of control in a single
company and persuaded Wisconsin and Geron to modify their agreement
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Under my proposed Bayh-Dole license, however, Geron’s
power would have been greatly diminished. Any recipient of
government funding wishing to study these embryonic stem
cells would be free to do so, under the terms of the proposed
license—the government funded the research leading to the
patent, and thus subsequent researchers who are also funded
by the government would have licenses to use the patented
technology.315 The researchers would also be excused from
paying royalties to Geron, freeing tax dollars to support other
research. Thus, the proposed license would remove many of the
barriers erected by patents obtained under the Bayh-Dole Act.
B. POTENTIAL IMPACT
Before considering whether such a proposal should be
implemented, its effects on the overall Bayh-Dole scheme, and
patent law incentives generally, need to be explored. Of critical
importance is how commercial entities will respond to the
change in the Bayh-Dole Act, and whether they will be more
reluctant to develop technology created with government
funding if the market of potential users is thus limited by the
removal of government-funded researchers with the royaltyfree license. Also important, however, are its positive aspects,
as the proposed license may be seen as at least a start in
developing a more robust experimental use exemption and a
biotechnology patent pool.
1. Potential Impact on Patent Incentives
Granting government-funded researchers a license to
patents arising from government-funded inventions might have
an adverse affect on licensing those patents for further
development. In particular, the proposed Bayh-Dole license
(resolving a lawsuit by the university against the company). See id. at 301
n.65, 309-10. Geron ceded exclusive control over three of the differentiated
cell types, retaining only neural cells, heart cells and pancreatic islet cells.
See Pollack, supra note 312. Both Wisconsin and Geron also agreed to allow
free use of the cells by academic and government scientists for research
purposes, retaining rights only for commercial use. See id.
315. This of course ignores other restrictions on embryonic stem cell
research, particularly President Bush’s ban on using federal funding to
perform research on stem cell lines other than those existing at the time the
ban was implemented on August 9, 2001. See Press Release, The White
House, Fact Sheet: Embryonic Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/20010809-1.html.
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raises the issue of whether the free use of the patented
invention in research that eventually results in a commercial
product will have a negative effect on the market for the
patented invention and thus destroy the incentive to develop
the patented invention—a result contrary to the purpose of the
Bayh-Dole Act.
If the resulting commercial product contains the patented
invention, and thus still infringes the patent, no problem
arises—the patentee will still control commercial use of the
final product since the proposed license does not include the
right to sell.316 For example, the hair restorer minoxidil was
originally patented as a compound for treating high blood
pressure (for which it is still used).317 One of the side effects of
its use as a high blood pressure treatment was hair growth,
and this method of use was subsequently patented as well.318
The original patent on the compound was still in effect at the
time the later patent issued, however, and so anyone wishing to
use minoxidil as a hair restorer needed to license the original
patent.319 Thus, the original patentee was able to collect
royalties for the use of minoxidil to restore hair and was
therefore compensated for the subsequent research on and use
of its patented compound.320 Differentiated human embryonic
stem cells used directly as a treatment would also fall into this
category—they will still be covered by the original patent on

316. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
317. See
MedicineNet.com,
Minoxidil
Oral,
http://www.medicinenet.com/minoxidil-oral/article.htm (last reviewed Mar. 2,
2005) (describing use of minoxidil to reduce blood pressure); U.S. Patent No.
3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965) (covering the compound now known as minoxidil;
indicated use is as hypertensive agent).
318. See
MedicineNet.com,
Minoxidil,
http://www.medicinenet.com/minoxidil/article.htm (last reviewed Dec. 31,
1997) (describing history and use of minoxidil to restore hair growth); U.S.
Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 19, 1977) (covering the method of using
minoxidil to restore hair growth).
319. This included the owner of the hair-growth-restoration method of use
patent. See Norman M. Goldfarb, When Patents Became Interesting in Clinical
Research, J. CLINICIAL RES. BEST PRACS., Mar. 2006, at 1-2,
http://www.firstclinical.com/resources/journal/0603/Patents.pdf.
And
conversely, the holder of the patent on minoxidil itself would need a license to
the method of use patent to sell minoxidil for hair restoration. This is thus an
example of a pair of blocking patents. See supra notes 126-128 and
accompanying text.
320. In the case of minoxidil, The Upjohn Company was actually the
assignee of both patents. See U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 (filed Nov. 1, 1965);
U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619 (filed Aug. 19, 1977).
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the embryonic stem cells themselves, and therefore the
patentee will be entitled to royalties on the commercial product.
A similar situation arises when the eventual product is a
mixture that still includes the patented invention as a
component.321
A problem regarding the incentives of the original patentee
does arise, however, when a researcher uses the patented
invention during development, but the invention is not present
in the final commercial product. In this situation, the patentee
has no control over sales of the non-infringing commercial
product and thus cannot recover the costs of developing the
original patent into a useful invention.
This problem can manifest itself in two ways.322 First,
researchers might use the patented invention to improve on,
design around, or avoid the patent itself.323 For example, a
researcher might use the patented invention as a point of
comparison for judging the effectiveness of a new invention.
Alternatively, the researcher might start with a patented
device and then gradually modify it until a non-infringing (and
possibly improved) competing device results. Some of the
earliest versions are likely to infringe the patent, even if the
final device does not. Such uses would be directly counter to
the interests of the patentee, but they are nevertheless an
important aspect of the purpose of experimental use and a
fundamental part of the patent system—getting patented
inventions into the hands of researchers so that they can be
exploited in these ways.
Second, researchers might use the invention as a tool to
further other research. Such research tools are one of the most
difficult elements of experimental use (and therefore of the
proposed license, insofar as it implements experimental use).
For example, a researcher might use a patented DNA or
protein product in an assay to find a novel pharmaceutical.
The final pharmaceutical typically will not include the patented
321. See, e.g., Combinations of Retinoids and Minoxidil-type Compounds
for Hair Growth, U.S. Patent No. 5,183,817 (filed Dec. 13, 1988); Minoxidil
Gel, U.S. Patent No. 5,225,189 (filed Feb. 18, 1988); Stimulation of Hair
Growth with Minoxidil and a 5α-Reductase Inhibitor, U.S. Patent No.
5,578,599 (filed Jan. 20, 1995).
322. These two ways track the distinction between “experimenting on” and
“experimenting with” the patented invention developed in the discussion of the
experimental use exemption. See supra notes 182-197 and accompanying text.
323. See FTC INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 175, at ch. 4, at 36.
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DNA or protein, and so will not itself infringe. Similarly, a
researcher might use human embryonic stem cells to assess the
efficacy and toxicity of a potential drug product. The final drug
product will again not fall under the original patent because it
does not include the human embryonic stem cells, and therefore
the patentee will not be entitled to royalties on the commercial
product. Some would view such a result as a desirable side
effect of the license proposal, as it helps resolve some perceived
problems of the current patent system.324 One potential way to
alleviate some of the harm caused by this situation would be to
allow the research to proceed without liability but then to
require payment of a royalty once a commercial product is
available.325 Many experimental use proposals exclude such
research tools,326 but they would not be excluded from the
proposed Bayh-Dole license.
Research tools do not present a problem with respect to
development incentives if they do not need further development
once they have been invented in the laboratory. The primary
justification for the Bayh-Dole Act is to provide an incentive to
get
commercial
development
of
government-funded
inventions;327 the original government funding agreement
provides the necessary incentive to make the invention in the
first place. If no such further development is needed, then the
Bayh-Dole incentive is similarly unnecessary, as the patentee
has no development costs to recover—these costs were already
paid by the government.328 Research tools also do not present a
324. Some of these problems are discussed supra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3. Cf.
Suzanne T. Michel, Comment, The Experimental Use Exception to
Infringement Applied to Federally Funded Inventions, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 369,
407 (1992) (“If the experimental work by a non-licensee results in a product
which designs around the basic research and does not infringe the original
patent, then federal funds spurred more development at the private level,
which is the point of government supported research. A licensee will be forced
to accept the possibility of increased design around activity. In response, the
licensee and licensor can account for the added risk through decreased royalty
rates.”).
325. See supra note 192 (discussing proposals by Mueller, supra note 174,
and Strandburg, supra note 174, for such a royalty system, as well as the
difficulties in calculating such a royalty).
326. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1074.
327. See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
328. As a corollary, the proposed license should result in a reduction in
patenting of this type of research tool. If a tool does not need further
development and is easily used by subsequent basic researchers, then the
original researcher will have no reason to patent it—most of those who need it
will be able to use it under the proposed Bayh-Dole license without paying
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problem if the further-developed product is itself patentable.
In this case, the commercial developer is protected by the later
patent, which, not having been developed with government
funding, is not eligible for the proposed Bayh-Dole license.329
When research tools require further development in order
to become commercial products but the further development is
not itself patentable, they can be handled via other, non-license
methods of appropriation. In the biotechnology context, this
appropriation can commonly be accomplished through
patenting of kits, where the biotechnology company assembles
the necessary reagents for patented processes into the kits.330
These kits greatly ease the conduct of research, as the
manufacturer takes the responsibility of making sure that each
necessary solution has precisely the correct composition.
Despite the fact that these kits typically cost more than the
individual reagents in them, researchers use them because
they are efficient, particularly when the time needed to mix the
reagents (and the time lost in repeating experiments when the
inevitable mistakes are made) is taken into account.331
As an example, consider the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR), one of the fundamental techniques of the modern
molecular biology laboratory.332 PCR allows scientists to start
royalties, effectively negating the benefits of the patent. The absence of a
patent would then free up the tool for use by all, including those ineligible for
the proposed license, which is good for research tools with wide application.
329. This analysis assumes that the subsequent development is not funded
by the government—a reasonable assumption, as such development is usually
funded by industry. See Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1666. If the subsequent
development is funded by the government, then the patent incentive should
again be unnecessary, and so the proposed Bayh-Dole license is appropriate.
330. See, e.g., CAFC Considers Validity of Marking with Patent Numbers,
24 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 448, 449 (2005).
331. Researchers use such kits even when the underlying process is not
patented, and so they are free to make use of the process/reagent. For
example, in the early years of biotechnology research, graduate students often
started their careers by purifying large quantities of a particular restriction
enzyme (a protein molecule that operates like a pair of molecular scissors,
cutting a DNA molecule at a precisely defined location). They would then
trade with other students who had purified different restriction enzymes (ones
that cut DNA in other precise locations). Personal Communication from
Haynes W. Sheppard, Jr., Director of Research, IGB Products, Ltd. (1986).
Once restriction enzymes became commercially available, this practice
stopped; even though most of the enzymes were not patented, and so students
were free to continue the practice, it was simply a waste of time to do so.
332. See Roche Molecular Diagnostics, PCR Explained, http://www.rochediagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_explained02.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
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with a very small amount of a particular piece of DNA and
generate large amounts of that DNA rapidly and efficiently
through a process often referred to as “gene amplification.”333
The basic chemical reagents needed to perform PCR—reaction
buffers,334 nucleotides, magnesium chloride—are cheap and
commonly found in any reasonably equipped laboratory.335 The
primary enzyme required for performing PCR, Taq
polymerase,336 is readily available from commercial sources (or
an ambitious researcher could even produce his or her own
enzyme). However, most researchers choose not to mix their
own reagents, instead preferring to purchase a kit containing
the necessary reagents, even though these kits often cost more
than the sum of the individual reagents they contain.337 They
333. See id. (describing the basic PCR process in detail); see also Roche
Molecular
Diagnostics,
Applications
of
PCR,
http://www.rochediagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_applications.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006)
(describing some of the medical diagnostic uses of PCR); Roche Molecular
Diagnostics,
Chronology
of
PCR
Technology,
http://www.rochediagnostics.com/ba_rmd/pcr_evolution.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2006)
(showing a timeline of the development of PCR).
334. A “reaction buffer” is a solution containing the salts and other soluble
elements needed to perform a particular biochemical process; the solution is
typically “buffered” to maintain a particular pH. PCR Reaction Buffer consists
of 100 mM Tris/HCl, 15 mM MgCl2, 500 mM KCl, pH 8.3 (the concentration of
MgCl2 may be varied for different applications). See Roche Applied Science,
Package Insert: PCR Core Kit (4th ver. July 2003), available at
http://www.roche-applied-science.com/pack-insert/1578553a.pdf.
These
reagents are all commonly found in the molecular biology laboratory.
335. See
Connie
Veilleux,
PCR
Technology,
http://www.accessexcellence.org/LC/SS/PS/PCR/PCR_technology.html
(last
visited Mar. 26, 2006).
336. Or a recombinant variant thereof. See, e.g., Roche Applied Science,
Product Information: Taq DNA Polymerase, http://www.roche-appliedscience.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/enzymes/taq.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2006) (“Taq DNA Polymerase is the recombinant form of the
enzyme from the thermophilic eubacterium Thermus aquaticus BM, expressed
in E. coli.”); see also Roche Applied Science, Product Information: FastStart
Taq
DNA
Polymerase,
http://www.roche-appliedscience.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/enzymes/faststart.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006) (“FastStart Taq DNA Polymerase is a
thermostable, chemically modified form of recombinant Taq DNA
Polymerase.”)
337. The popularity of this option is evidenced by the number of companies
that sell such kits. See, e.g., Roche Applied Science, Product Information: PCR
Core
Kit,
http://www.roche-appliedscience.com/fst/amplification.htm?/sis/amplification/pifs/mixes_kits/pcr_core.ht
m (last visited Mar. 26, 2006); Sigma-Aldrich Co., Online Catalog: PCR Core
Kit
with
Taq
DNA
Polymerase,
http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/catalog/search/ProductDetail/SIGMA/CORET
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006). Some companies have simplified the process even
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can then simply add their own particular DNA templates and
primers and perform the reactions quickly and easily. The kits
free the researchers from the need to measure and mix all of
these reagents individually, and also from concern over errors
in measuring the reagents each time they need to be mixed.338
And with PCR, kits provide an additional advantage. DNA
amplification by PCR is so powerful that even trace amounts of
contaminating DNA can grow into large artifacts,
compromising the integrity of the research. Companies certify
that their kits are free of such contaminants.339
From the perspective of the company, kits generally allow
patentees to recover costs from researchers without needing to
sue or license them individually—the researchers pay a royalty
built in to the price of the kit in exchange for a license to use
the reagent or method embodied in the kit.340 Researchers are
further, mixing the reagents into a single tube. See, e.g., Promega Corp.,
Online
Catalog:
PCR
Master
Mix,
http://www.promega.com/catalog/CatalogProducts.asp?catalog%5Fname=Prom
ega%5FProducts&category%5Fname=PCR+Master+Mix&description%5Ftext
=PCR+Master+Mix (last visited Mar. 26, 2006); Invitrogen Corp., Online
Catalog:
PCR
SuperMixes,
https://catalog.invitrogen.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=viewCatalog.viewProduct
Details&productDescription=569&CMP=LEC-GCMSSEARCH&HQS=10572
(last visited Mar. 26, 2006). A Google search for “PCR Kit” reveals many more
providers.
See
Google,
Search
Results,
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=PCR+Kit (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
338. The advantage of the kits multiplies as the number of reagents
increases and the degree of precision in amount of each reagent increases. For
example, using the PCR to determine the order of the bases in a piece of DNA
(PCR sequencing) requires many more reagent mixtures than the basic PCR.
Furthermore, the exact amounts of the nucleotides and special terminator
nucleotides are crucial, with even slight errors often resulting in failure of the
process. For this reason, researchers rarely mix their own sequencing
reagents, instead relying on commercial kits. See, e.g., Promega Corp., Online
DNA
Cycle
Sequencing
System,
Catalog:
fmol®
http://www.promega.com/catalog/CatalogProducts.asp?catalog%5Fname=Prom
ega%5FProducts&category%5Fname=fmol+DNA+Cycle+Sequencing+System
&description%5Ftext=%3Ci%3Efmol%3C%2Fi%3E%3Csup%3E%26%23x00AE
%3B%3C%2Fsup%3E+DNA+Cycle+Sequencing+System (last visited Mar. 26,
2006); USB Corp., Online Catalog: Thermo Sequenase™ Cycle Sequencing Kit,
http://www.usbweb.com/category.asp?cat=dna&id=78500# (last visited Mar.
26, 2006).
339. See Roche Applied Science, supra note 334. Furthermore, unlike what
is present in the researcher’s laboratory, any remaining contaminating DNA is
unlikely to be the DNA the researcher is studying, reducing the likelihood that
it will cause problems.
340. For example, the package insert for the Roche PCR kit contains the
following language:
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willing to pay the additional price for the convenience and
reproducibility. Indeed, biotechnology patents (and others)
often include specific claims directed to kits for performing the
Thus, kits let
patented method, for just this reason.341
patentees recover their costs from researchers without having
to worry about licensing them individually.
With kits, the true risk to the patentee is competitors who
sell their own kits, potentially at a reduced cost,342 drawing
researchers away from the patentee’s kit. If the kit is itself
patented, the competitor can be sued directly for selling an
A license under U.S. Patents 4,683,202, 4,683,195, and 4,965,188 or
their foreign counterparts, owned by Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.
and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd (“Roche”), has an up-front fee
component and a running-royalty component. The purchase price of
this product includes limited, nontransferable rights under the
running-royalty component to use only this amount of the product to
practice the Polymerase Chain Reaction (“PCR”) and related
processes described in said patents solely for the research and
development activities of the purchaser.
Id. The Invitrogen PCR SuperMixes Product Manual and the Sigma-Aldrich
PCR Core Kit Technical Bulletin contain identical language. See Invitrogen
Life Techs., AccuPrime Pfx SuperMix (Oct. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.invitrogen.com/content/sfs/manuals/accuprimepfxsupermix_man.p
df; Sigma-Aldrich Co., Technical Bulletin: PCR Core Kit with Taq DNA
Polymerase
(June
2002),
available
at
http://www.sigmaaldrich.com/sigma/bulletin/coretbul.pdf. However, Promega
Corp. has challenged the validity of the basic PCR patents, and so its PCR
Master Mix Product Usage Information sheet does not include this language.
Instead, the Information sheet states:
The PCR process is covered by patents issued and applicable in
certain countries. Promega does not encourage or support the
unauthorized or unlicensed use of the PCR process. Use of this
product is recommended for persons that either have a license to
perform PCR or are not required to obtain a license. . . . Certain
applications of this product are covered by patents issued and
applicable in certain countries. Because purchase of this product does
not include a license to perform any patented application, users of
this product may be required to obtain a patent license depending
upon the particular application and country in which the product is
used.
Promega Corp., Product Usage Information: PCR Master Mix (April 2004),
available at http://www.promega.com/tbs/9pim750/9pim750.pdf.
341. See, e.g., Kits for Amplifying and Detecting Nucleic Acid Sequences,
U.S. Patent No. 6,197,563 (filed Nov. 18, 1994); Method and Kit or [sic]
Detecting Antibodies to Antigens of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2
(Hiv-2), U.S. Patent No. 5,055,391 (filed Jan. 3, 1990); see also In re Ngai, 367
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the patentability of a kit for performing
a new biotechnology method).
342. Competitors can typically undercut the patentee because they can ride
on the coattails of the patentee, using the patentee’s research to design the kit,
and thus avoid incurring the patentee’s research costs.
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infringing kit.343 If the relevant patent claims only the method,
however, the competitor is not directly infringing, because it is
not itself practicing the method; it is simply selling a kit that
allows others to practice the method and infringe the patent.344
However, in this situation, the patent law still provides a
remedy: a suit against the competitor for contributory
infringement or inducing infringement.345 Returning to the
PCR example, because the technique is so important in the
molecular biology laboratory, the owners of the patents
covering various aspects of PCR have repeatedly sued the
manufacturers of PCR kits for contributory infringement,
rather than suing individual researchers for direct
343. See, e.g., In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (discussing a patent owner’s suit against Cambridge Biotech for
selling kits for detecting HIV-2 antibodies; some of the claims of one of the
patents in suit, the ’391 patent, supra note 341, covered kits). The patentee
may also sue for direct infringement if the kit contains a component that is
itself separately patented. See, e.g., id. (discussing the claims of another
patent in suit, Peptides Related to Human Immunodeficiency Virus II (HIV-2),
U.S. Patent No. 5,051,496 (filed Jan. 16, 1987), which covered only particular
peptides used in the kits).
344. In these cases, the individual researchers are the ones actually
infringing the patent by using the competitor’s kits to perform the patented
method.
Thus, the patentee could theoretically sue these individual
researchers for direct infringement. Patentees, however, are generally
reluctant to sue individual researchers, in part because it is costly and
impractical to sue so many parties and in part because the researchers are
potential customers who are likely to be alienated if they are sued. See
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (noting that
the contributory infringement doctrine removed the need for “the patentee to
undertake the almost insuperable task of finding and suing all the innocent
purchasers who technically were responsible for completing the
infringement”); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 293 (suggesting in
a hypothetical that patentees prefer to sue the contributory infringer rather
than the direct infringers, who “may be present or potential customers” of the
patentee).
345. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000) (providing cause of action for
contributory infringement); id. § 271(b) (providing a cause of action for
inducing infringement).
The competitor will typically be liable for
contributory infringement for providing a kit for which the only use is to
infringe the patented method, and for inducing infringement for providing
specific instructions for performing the infringing method. For examples of
such suits in the biotechnology context, see Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (involving a defendant sued for
selling diagnostic kits using antibodies and instructions for using them; claims
of the patent in suit, Immunometric Assays Using Monoclonal Antibodies, U.S.
Patent No. 4,376,110 (filed Aug. 4, 1980), covered only methods); and
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1371
(Fed.Cir.1986) (same).
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infringement.346
Both because the Bayh-Dole license does not extend to
sales of the patented invention347 and because the commercial
competitor is not a researcher funded by the government, the
sale of kits will not be covered by the Bayh-Dole license. Thus,
the seller will remain liable for infringement, leaving the
patentee with its desired remedy. One important caveat to
this, however, is that both contributory and induced
infringement require a direct infringement by someone. If the
competitor sells the kit to a researcher who has a Bayh-Dole
license, then the researcher is not directly infringing, and so
the competitor cannot be indirectly infringing.348 The license
therefore needs to be carefully drafted to exclude coverage for
using a kit made by a competitor in a way that infringes the
patent, at least in the case where the patentee itself provides
such a kit commercially.349
A similar analysis pertains if performing the patented
method requires a specialized apparatus—the provider of the
apparatus will be liable for contributory infringement. For
example, Professors Rai and Eisenberg discuss DNA
sequencing machines as a technology that was properly
patented under Bayh-Dole, because while the underlying
research tool was created via government-funded research,
developing the research tool into a commercial product required
the exclusive licensee to make substantial commercial
346. See, e.g., Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1642 (N.D. Cal. 1994); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cetus
Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1174 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (infringement counterclaim). The
patents at issue in both of these suits, Process for Amplifying, Detecting,
and/or Cloning Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No. 4,683,195 (filed Feb.
7, 1986), and Process for Amplifying Nucleic Acid Sequences, U.S. Patent No.
4,683,202 (filed Oct. 25, 1985), claim only methods.
347. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
348. See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding no direct infringement because alleged direct
infringers had implied license to perform the claimed method, and therefore
defendant could not, as a matter of law, be guilty of contributory
infringement); Saxe v. Hammond, 21 F.Cas. 593, 594 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875)
(“There is no evidence, in this record, of a sale to an unlicensed manufacturer”
as would be required for direct infringement, and therefore no contributory
infringement). Of course, as previously discussed, if the kit is directly covered
by the patent or includes a component that is directly covered, then indirect
liability is not needed—the patentee can sue the competitor directly on the kit
claim.
349. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5) (permitting patentee to condition license on
purchase of a separate product).
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investment.350 Under the proposed license, researchers could
build their own sequencing machines without fear of
infringement liability, but they are very unlikely to do so—they
can much more efficiently buy the machines from the licensee
than they can replicate the complex technology involved.351
Therefore, the value in the patent is in the ability to prevent
competitors from making and selling machines and
undercutting the patentee on price, not in the ability to prevent
researchers from making their own machines.352 Thus, the real
risk for this category of patented inventions is from market
competitors making sales, not researchers using the invention
for their research, and so the proposed Bayh-Dole license will
not have an adverse affect on the patentee.353
Thus, the proposed license presents a problem only if a
research tool (a) needs further development, but (b) the
developer has no viable way to recover the cost of this
development other than through direct licensing of the original
patent. Although this category of research tools is problematic,
it is likely to be quite small—most relevant research tools will
be either simple enough to need no further development or else
sufficiently complex to be themselves patentable or to require
350. See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 302-03 & n.69.
351. See EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 223, at 29 n.21 (“Most scientists are
not engaged in manufacturing and will readily purchase rather than make
patented products—such as microscopes, reagents, or biological materials—
when they meet specifications and are commercially available for a reasonable
fee.”).
352. A similar point, in a slightly different context, is made by Professor
Eisenberg. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome
Project: Problems with Patenting Research Tools, 5 RISK 163, 173 (1994)
(“[P]rotection against competitors who would sell the product to researchers
provides some measure of protection. So long as other large scale producers
can be excluded from the market, the patent holder will be able to reap the
benefits of any significant economies of scale in production of the research
tool.”). But see id. (“The lack of a remedy against researchers who make the
invention themselves would still set an upper bound on the ability of patent
holders to charge full monopoly prices, since at a certain point researchers
might find it cost effective to make the research tool themselves rather than to
buy it from the patent holder.”).
353. Not surprisingly, similar suits have arisen in the PCR context,
concerning the thermocycler apparatus required to perform PCR. Roche and
its licensee, Applera Corp., sued a maker of competing thermocyclers for
indirect infringement of the ’195 and ’202 patents on the basic PCR methods,
supra note 346, as well as for direct infringement of certain patents on the
thermocyclers themselves. See Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 372 F.
Supp. 2d 233 (D. Conn. 2005).
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reagents or apparatus that can be sold as a kit. Furthermore,
recovering development costs in such cases is likely to be
extremely difficult even without the proposed license. Because
any infringement would be by individual researchers using
specific techniques and reagents in their own laboratories,
without the need to purchase anything commercially that is
directly tied to the patent, the patentee would have to track
down and sue each of these researchers individually—an
endeavor that is likely to be impractical at best, and
prohibitively expensive.354 One possibility might be to handle
these inventions in a different way. For the small class of
inventions that need further development but for which costs
cannot be recovered because of the proposed license, then
perhaps the government should fund such development directly
via its normal funding channels, rather than leaving it to the
market via the patent incentive.355
Another possible objection to the proposal is that a
required licensing provision would limit the flexibility of the
agencies to deny such licenses when they determine that such
licenses would be contrary to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.
As discussed below, Dr. Rohrbaugh indicated that the NIH was
already implementing a similar scheme into its licenses,356 and
he suggested that codification could possibly limit the options of
the NIH.357 If desired, this objection could easily be addressed
by incorporating flexibility into the implementing documents.

354. As noted by Professor Eisenberg:
Making and using a patented invention within a research laboratory
is not very conspicuous and may never come to the attention of the
patent holder. Even if the patent holder knows about the use, it
might not be worth the trouble and expense of pursuing a lawsuit
against a researcher who does not represent a significant threat to
the patent holder’s commercial interests.
Eisenberg, supra note 174, at 1071-72.
355. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 1673 (describing a pre-Bayh-Dole
proposal by the Attorney General that would have implemented this type of
government-funded development scheme for all government inventions that
industry was not willing to develop without an exclusive license).
356. Transcript of Committee on Intellectual Property in Genomic and
Protein Research Innovation, National Academies 146 (Feb. 27, 2004),
available
at
http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Genomics_Committee_Meeting_1_tra
nscript.pdf (transcribing, among others, presentation by Dr. Mark Rohrbaugh,
Director, Office of Technology Transfer, National Institutes of Health,
discussing NIH policies on technology transfer in the biotechnology area,
including interpretations of Bayh-Dole) [hereinafter Rohrbaugh Presentation].
357. See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279.
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However, such flexibility is neither necessary nor desirable.358
Given the logic behind the proposal, there seem to be no
circumstances under which the license should be denied.
Furthermore, making the requirement compulsory on the
agencies gives them the leverage to demand the right—they
need merely point to the requirement, without an exception,
and the funding recipient has no room for argument. A codified
right would also be much more resistant to changes in
administrations (both at the level of the agency and at the level
of the federal government as a whole). A codified requirement
would have the additional advantage of applying to all federal
agencies, not just the NIH.
2. Experimental Use
The proposed reform will implement a limited form of the
common law experimental use exemption, as it lets
government-funded researchers infringe certain patents in
connection with their government-funded research without fear
of liability. Its coverage is, of course, less broad than the
traditional common law experimental use exemption, as it
applies only to a limited group of patents and researchers, and
therefore it does not meet all of the goals of experimental use.
Nonetheless, the proposed Bayh-Dole license is a useful step in
the right direction.
The proposed license does not require making a distinction
between experimenting on the patented invention and using
the patented invention as a tool for other research;359 the
government-funded researcher exemption applies to all
government-funded research that involves the use of inventions
arising from government-funded research.
However, one
weakness of its limited scope is that it does not allow
researchers to use research tools created with private funds,
which in many instances may be the most important tools.360
358. See infra note 387 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages
of uniform treatment of all patents under the proposed licensing scheme).
359. As discussed earlier, this can be a difficult distinction to make. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 239, at 114-15.
360. Dr. Rohrbaugh mentions particularly the cre/lox technology for
generating specific gene mutations and the oncomouse technology for creating
animal models to study human cancer. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra
note 356, at 147 (“I would note that we already have a challenge in some cases
in collaborating with industry in conducting research with proprietary
materials when industry receives a benefit in terms of an option to license
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Even so, it is a useful step in the right direction—and if it
works well, it could serve as a “pilot program” to pave the way
for broadening the experimental use exemption, either
voluntarily via some sort of patent pool (as discussed in the
next Section) or by legislative expansion.
3. Patent Pools
In addition to implementing a limited version of the
common law experimental use exemption, the proposed BayhDole licensing scheme might also be viewed as a rough patent
pool. As described above, in a patent pool, individual patentees
assign their patents to a single collective entity, in exchange for
royalties and a license to use the other patents in the pool.
Since the proposed license does not involve royalties, it would
not be like a pool in this respect. However, in many instances,
the main function of a patent pool is to provide access to the
patents in the pool, not to make money directly from the patent
royalties,361 and in this respect the proposal is very much like a
patent pool.
The proposed license could, of course, also be viewed (with
considerable justice) as a compulsory license with royalty of
zero.362 However, the limited membership in the pool, coupled
with its reciprocal nature—anyone who uses patents from the
pool must be doing research funded by the government, and the
funding would carry the obligation to license any patents
generated from the research to others doing research funded by
the government—makes the analogy to a patent pool valid, at
least in a limited sense.
Many of the historical patent pools that have arisen to
resolve blocking problems in various industries ultimately
inventions or rights to data. This is still a challenge. It is a challenge with
Krilocks [sic, cre/lox] and oncomouse.”). Professors Rai and Eisenberg also
discuss some of the problems with licensing these technologies, see Rai &
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 296 n.40, as do Professors Heller and Eisenberg,
see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 133, at 699-700.
361. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing the airplane
and automobile patent pools).
362. “The term ‘compulsory licensing’ refers to a governmental requirement
that a patent owner permit another to perform otherwise infringing acts at a
mandated rate.” MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PATENT LAW 1062 (2d ed. 2003). Compulsory licenses are rarely found in U.S.
intellectual property law (there are exceptions in patent law for air pollution
controls, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000), and atomic energy inventions, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2183 (2000)), although they are more common under international regimes.
See id.
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required government intervention to get the pool started.363
Ideally, that is exactly what will happen under the proposed
license: The NIH will in effect serve as the holder of the patent
pool for the benefit of all its researchers.364 Such an outcome
would advance the underlying goals of Bayh-Dole while
ameliorating some of its undesired side effects.
If the proposed Bayh-Dole license is successful, it might
even serve as the basis for a true patent pool. Perhaps the NIH
could expand the pool to allow biotechnology companies doing
research that is not funded by the government to join the pool.
These companies would submit their patents for use by
government-funded researchers in exchange for rights to use
the other patents in the pool.365 If the pool did expand in this
way, the NIH might be able to incorporate a limited royalty
structure, under which the commercial members paid royalties
for all uses (of patents from government-funded research and
from other commercial members), while the government-funded
members paid royalties only to the commercial members,
retaining the free license to use patents from governmentfunded research.366 At this point, the license system would
operate much like a real biotechnology patent pool, solving
many of the blocking problems previously discussed, such as
the problem of the anticommons. Even if the NIH license pool
did not itself expand in this way, the industry might see that it
works well, and thus it might provide the impetus (and
mechanism) to implement a broad pooling system.367
363. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1356-57 & n.226 (discussing formation
of the aircraft and synthetic rubber research patent pools at the behest of the
government, triggered by U.S. entry in to World War I and II, respectively).
364. Cf. id. at 1356 (suggesting that “[t]he government should assist in
some cases the formation of pools and other exchange mechanisms”).
365. Such an innovation might create the need for a screening mechanism
for the submission of patents to the pool. Otherwise, companies would have
an incentive to give worthless patents to the pool, in exchange for rights to the
valuable patents in the pool, while holding back their own valuable patents
and continuing to charge royalties. This situation might be addressed by
requiring that all patents held by a company be assigned to the pool in
exchange for access to the pool.
366. See Merges, supra note 130, at 1341-42 (“Typically, firms are required
to license into the pool all patents covering technology of use to the industry.
In exchange, pool members are permitted to use any other member’s
technology for a set fee. Often these fees are calibrated to reflect the
significance of the technology being licensed.” (footnote omitted)).
367. That the industry might be willing to join such pools, possibly even
without royalties, is evidenced by IBM’s pledge to give 500-plus patents to the
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C. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The most efficient method of implementation would avoid
the need for legislative action, if existing law permits; if not,
then Congress would need to ascertain the best legislative
solution. Further, the specific terms of the license need to be
carefully constructed to implement the proposed license in a
way that is most useful to researchers while interfering as little
as possible with the rights of the patentees. Finally, the
question of who, exactly, can participate in the license needs to
be addressed.
1. Implementation
As noted above, the current Bayh-Dole Act reserves for the
government a license to inventions developed with government
funding:
With respect to any invention in which the contractor elects rights,
the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable [sic],
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or on
behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the
world.368

The simplest method of implementing the proposal would
be for the NIH to utilize this reserved license to allow anyone
receiving government funds to use, in their research, all
patented inventions made with government funding. The NIH
could declare (either in a policy statement or possibly as a
regulation) that it deems anyone funded by federal research
dollars to be practicing the patented invention “on behalf of the
United States” and therefore to be licensed to use the patent. A
provision implementing such a license would become a
public domain for use in developing open source software. See Press Release,
IBM, IBM Pledges 500 U.S. Patents to Open Source in Support of Innovation
and
Open
Standards
(Jan.
11,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ibm.com/press/PressServletForm.wss?MenuChoice=pressreleases&
TemplateName=ShowPressReleaseTemplate&SelectString=t1.docunid=7473&
TableName=DataheadApplicationClass&SESSIONKEY=any&WindowTitle=P
ress+Release&STATUS=publish; see also Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at
298-99 (discussing the SNP Consortium, in which several corporations and
other institutions agreed to make public their databases of small nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs, which are important tools that help researchers
pinpoint the locations of disease and other genes on the chromosomes), rather
than protecting them with patents or other intellectual property). See
generally Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004) (discussing recent efforts of private parties to enrich
the public domain, rather than appropriate knowledge via intellectual
property).
368. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
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standard part of any government funding contract. Under the
provision, the funding recipient would receive a license (in
effect a sublicense of the government’s license) to use all
government-funded discoveries, while the government would
specifically reserve the right to license other governmentfunded researchers to use any patents developed during the
funding recipient’s research.369
This method of implementation might, however, present
certain difficulties.370 First, although to date there have been
no judicial interpretations of the term “for or on behalf of the
United States” in this statute,371 thus allowing the agencies
some leeway, the existing definitions of the means of funding
research may create problems with adopting this
interpretation. True contract work—which by definition is “to
acquire . . . property or services for the direct benefit or use of
the United States Government”372—can easily be viewed as “for
or on behalf of the United States.” Thus, work done pursuant
to government contracts should already fall within the
government’s reserved license. However, the NIH and other
agencies fund most research through grants, which by
definition are used “to transfer a thing of value to the . . .
recipient to carry out a public purpose of support or stimulation
authorized by a law of the United States instead of acquiring . .

369. Interestingly, in Madey v. Duke University, Duke asserted that it had
such a license under the Bayh-Dole Act, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4), to
use Madey’s patented invention in its research projects. Madey v. Duke
University, 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 425, 428-29 & n.3 (M.D.N.C. 2001), rev’d in
part by 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Duke argued that its research was
“authorized by the Government, conducted for the Government, or funded by
the Government” and therefore fell under the government’s reserved BayhDole license. Id. at 425. The District Court found that the experimental use
exemption applied, so it did not reach this defense, although it did note the
argument’s basic plausibility. See id. at 428-29 & n.3. The Federal Circuit
found the record on this point insufficient and remanded the issue to the
District Court. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). On remand, the court rejected the
defense as a matter of law, holding that it belonged to the government and
could not be asserted by a private party. Madey v. Duke University, 2006 WL
267187 at *7-11 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 31, 2006). However, the failure of this defense
has very little direct relation to my proposal, which requires at the very least
that any such license must be written into the grant, which was not the case
in Madey.
370. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 137-40.
371. See id. at 139-40.
372. 31 U.S.C. § 6303(1) (2000).
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. property or services for the direct benefit or use of the United
States Government,”373 and thus are more of an assistance
mechanism directed at the recipient.374 Declaring work under
a grant to be “on behalf of the United States” is therefore
something of a leap, and it would probably be an inappropriate
extension of the reserved right.375
Furthermore, declaring that research is “for or on behalf of
the United States” has implications far beyond the simple issue
of patent licenses.376 In general, such a declaration gives the
government significant control over the funded project, far
beyond that normally conveyed by a research grant.377 If a
particular piece of research work is “for or on behalf of the
United States,” then the agency will be looking for a specific
type of result to fulfill a specific goal and so will want direct
control over implementation, to ensure that it is getting that
type of result. Most grantees would be very reluctant to cede
such control to the agency, as they value their independence
and look askance at any attempt by the government to control
the direction of the research.378 Furthermore, the agency
probably would not want control anyway—when it needs or
desires such a directed result, it uses a requirements contract
rather than a grant. In addition, the government might, by
making such a declaration, open itself up to liability for patent

373. Id. § 6304(1) (emphasis added).
374. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40.
375. See NIH RESEARCH TOOLS REPORT, supra note 193, at app. D (“It is
not clear whether NIH’s retained license . . . allows NIH to authorize use of
subject inventions by other recipients of NIH grants.”). The appendix also
discusses the distinction between contracts and grants. See id.
376. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40 (“There are a
lot of implications that are negative with respect to working on or behalf of the
U.S. government in receiving grants.”). In a subsequent interview, Dr.
Rohrbaugh clarified that he was referring to the loss of control and loss of
some rights that typically accompany working directly for the government.
See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279; see also NIH RESEARCH TOOLS
REPORT, supra note 193, at app. D n.14 (“A broader interpretation of the
retained license might also have implications for appropriations and grants
law that neither the NIH nor other Federal agencies would welcome.”).
377. See 31 U.S.C. § 6304(2) (stating that a grant is used when “substantial
involvement is not expected between the executive agency and the . . .
recipient when carrying out the activity contemplated in the agreement”);
Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40.
378. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139-40 (“But
recipients of funding under grants, by and large, . . . are not acting on or
behalf of the US government, and most of them don’t want to be considered as
acting on or behalf of the US government.” (emphasis added)).
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infringement by grantees.379 If the research is “for or on behalf
of the United States,” then any infringement is also for the
benefit of the United States, leading to potential liability for
infringement damages.380 For similar reasons, this declaration
might also have other tort liability consequences for the United
Sates.381 The United States would understandably not want to
assume these liabilities for every grant it issues.382
One possible way to avoid these problems is for the
Department of Commerce (which has responsibility for BayhDole Act implementation383) to either adopt or permit
individual agencies to adopt a special definition of “on behalf of
the United States.”384 Commerce could limit the definition to
implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act and no other contexts,
specifically excluding things like patent infringement and tort
liability.385 The agencies could then implement the proposed
379. See id. at 140 (“There is also increased liability and other issues that
would pertain to the government, in which the government would not want
these parties to be considered engaged in activities on behalf of the
government.”). In our interview, Dr. Rohrbaugh clarified that he was
referring to liability for patent infringement being attributed to the United
States. See Rohrbaugh Interview, supra note 279.
380. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.227-3 (2004) (providing clause to be used in
contracts negotiated under the F.A.R. requiring contractors to indemnify the
United States against liability for patent infringement, subject to certain
exceptions); cf. also id. §§ 52.227-1, -2, -4 to -7 (providing related clauses); id.
§ 28.203 (giving instructions on when to use the various clauses). Note that
the United States can be liable for damages for patent infringement, but
injunctive relief is not available. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
381. In our interview, Dr. Rohrbaugh also clarified that he was referring to
liability for torts being attributed to the United States. Rohrbaugh Interview,
supra note 279. The federal government waived its sovereign immunity
against tort claims, subject to certain conditions, in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, Title IV, 60 Stat. 843 (1946) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
382. Cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (providing clause to be used in contracts
negotiated under the F.A.R. requiring contractors to maintain insurance
against tort liability; United States will cover remaining uninsured tort
damages, subject to certain exceptions); id. § 28.311 (giving instructions on
when to use the clause).
383. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 202(b)(1), 207(b), 208 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
384. Commerce has apparently to date declined to give the statute this
interpretation. See Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356, at 139 (“There
has been an issue . . . that the license applies and should apply to our
recipients of all funding, including our grantees. The government, the
Department of Commerce, other agencies, have never taken that view in
interpreting the words ‘for or on behalf of the US government’ . . . under BayhDole.”).
385. The term “on behalf of the United States” appears in other places in
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license pursuant to this definition.386
The options under this course raises the question of
uniformity—that is, should the license policy be uniform
throughout the government, or could it be enacted on an
agency-by-agency basis? Ideally, the policy should be uniform,
so that government-funded researchers do not have to be aware
of the policy of every agency that funds research leading to
patents that they might infringe. Part of the purpose of the
license is to let researchers get on with the process of research,
without worry over patent infringement of government-funded
patents, and so seeing the magic words “this invention was
made with Government support and . . . the Government has
certain rights in the invention”387 in a patent should end the
matter. This purpose would be severely undermined if not all
government-funded patents fell under the proposed license, and
thus researchers had to take the further step of identifying the
funding agency and then researching its licensing policies.
the U.S. Code, but the contexts are so different that they should not create
problems with using a special definition for purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act.
See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 403a (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to
accept, “on behalf of the United States,” title to the land that became
Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks); 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(2000) (discussing transfer of proceedings in rem brought “by or on behalf of
the United States”). Closer in context are some provisions in the tax code
authorizing tax exemptions for work in certain industries done “for, or on
behalf of, the United States,” but these appear to contemplate a typical
government contractor relationship. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 5851 (2000) (“The
Secretary may relieve any person manufacturing firearms for, or on behalf of,
the United States from compliance with any provision of this chapter [relating
to special taxes on “Machine Guns, Destructive Devices, and Certain Other
Firearms”] in the conduct of such business.”).
386. In his presentation, Dr. Rohrbaugh suggests that the NIH is already
doing this on a limited basis: “[A]ll of our exclusive licenses have reserved the
right for others to use the intellectual property, the research tool, to the extent
there is one, for research purposes.” Rohrbaugh Presentation, supra note 356,
at 146. However, he seems to be referring to patents owned by the NIH itself,
arising out of its own intramural research. The NIH has much wider latitude
in placing terms in licenses for the patents it owns than it does in imposing
conditions on patents that will be owned by its funding recipients under the
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act.
387. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(6) (requiring this provision in all patents on
inventions arising from federal funding). But see Coe A. Bloomberg, Federal
Funded Inventions and Bayh-Dole Act Compliance: Do You Really Own What
You Think You Own?, 16 NO. 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 1, 4 (2004) (discussing a
GAO survey of compliance with the requirements of Bayh-Dole, including the
notice requirement, for patents on inventions arising from government-funded
research, which found that compliance with these requirements was “dismal”;
also noting that the government did not seem to be doing anything to enforce
the requirements).
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Nevertheless, if Commerce is unwilling to go that far,
implementation by individual agencies would still be preferable
to the current situation, and such a partial implementation
could serve as the starting point for full implementation in the
future. However, within each agency, the policy needs to be
uniform, rather than addressing each contract individually, as
the confusion noted above would be magnified dramatically if
each patent required a separate inquiry.
Case-by-case
determinations would also suffer from all of the drawbacks
noted above for the proposal advanced by Professors Rai and
Eisenberg.
Another provision that might give the agencies the
necessary power to implement the proposed change is found in
the Act’s opening statement of policy and objectives. This
section identifies one of the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act as “to
ensure that inventions made by nonprofit organizations and
small business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise.”388 However, in 2000, Congress
passed an amendment that qualified this goal: “to ensure that
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business
firms are used in a manner to promote free competition and
enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and
discovery.”389 Commerce (or possibly an individual agency)
could declare that the current system was “unduly
encumbering future research and discovery”390 and that it
needed to be fixed by freeing future government-funded
researchers to use patented technology that was developed with
government funds. Although this section of the statute is
really just a statement of purpose, Congress took the trouble to
amend it in 2000, so the changed language should be given
The proposed Bayh-Dole license
some practical effect.391
388. 35 U.S.C. § 200.
389. Id. (emphasis added).
390. The agency would probably need to hold hearings and otherwise
gather evidence to prove the point, but it should be able to do so adequately.
391. The history behind this amendment is rather obscure. It was enacted
as part of the Technology Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000, H.R. 209,
which was concerned primarily with the circumstances under which federal
agencies should grant exclusive licenses to technology it owned. See H.R. REP.
NO. 106-209, pt. 1, at 1 (1999). The version of the bill passed out of committee
on May 6, 1999, did not contain this particular amendment to § 200. See id. at
2-5; 145 CONG. REC. H2919 (daily ed. May 6, 1999) (report of Rep.
Sensenbrenner). The House of Representatives then took up the bill on May
11, 1999, and the version introduced then did contain this amendment. See
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embodies the goal of the amended statutory language, and so
might be enacted under its auspices.
Alternatively, Congress could simply add a new subsection
to the Bayh-Dole Act that requires (or at least specifically
allows) the agencies to grant such licenses. This is certainly
the cleanest method, as it removes the possibility of disgruntled
patentees challenging the action as beyond the power of the
agencies. It would also implement a desirable uniform policy
across all funding agencies. However, a mechanism that
allowed the agency to make the change, rather than requiring
congressional action, would be more expedient, as the agency is
likely to be less resistant to this type of change, and indeed
might even embrace it.392 The agency would also likely be able
to move more quickly on the matter.393
Whichever body institutes the change would have to pay
close attention to timing issues. Suddenly changing the rules
of who can freely use patents raises the specter of unwelcome
takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.394 A patent is
generally considered a strong property right, and thus a
government-imposed restriction on against whom it can be
asserted would almost certainly be resisted by patentees as a
taking of a property right without compensation.395
The simplest way to address this concern would be to make
the change prospective only. This solution would then raise the
question of what should be the relevant event for the
prospective cutoff. The most obvious event would be the patent
application itself, applying the limitation only to applications
145 CONG. REC. H2941 (daily ed. May 11, 1999); see also 145 CONG. REC.
S5041-42 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (documenting that the text of S. 999, the
counterpart to H.R. 209, also contained the amendment). The record is silent
as to how (and why) the text of the bill changed during this time.
392. Cf. supra notes 277, 284-285 and accompanying text (discussing the
scientists in charge of the NIH).
393. Cf. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 115
(“Realistically, the likelihood that Congress will pass research-exception
legislation in the absence of compelling circumstances is small. Accordingly,
we recommend consideration of administrative action.”).
394. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
395. Whether it would in fact be a taking raises some very interesting
questions of takings law regarding what, exactly, has been taken and whether
taking that causes the requisite level of harm to the property interest. Indeed,
these are questions that would arise in any proposal that attempts to limit the
patent right, such as implementing an expanded experimental use right;
however, they do not seem to be addressed by such proposals.. Further
exposition of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article and is left for future
development.
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filed after the effective date of the implementing regulation (or
legislation). However, at this point, the researcher will have
already conducted the research leading to such applications
pursuant to an earlier funding agreement.
This earlier
agreement will arguably have led the researcher to believe that
any patent he or she obtained on the research would not
contain such a limitation, and therefore the researcher would
likely try to assert that this change in expectation was still a
taking.396 To address this concern, the triggering event could
be the approval of the grant application, with the exemption
applying only to patents granted on inventions arising from
research conducted pursuant to funding agreements made after
the effective date of the implementing statute or regulation.
On the other hand, given the language of §202(c)(4), an agency
could certainly take the position that licensing “on behalf of the
government” was part of the bargain when the patentee took
title under the terms of the Bayh-Dole Act, and so the patentee
has no grounds to complain—another advantage of using that
provision rather than relying on congressional action.
2. Terms of the License
Another important consideration is the scope of the rights
that the license should give to government-funded researchers
(or, conversely, what limitations it should impose on patentees).
The license should be limited to research activities, provide for
certain limited sublicensing, require notification of the patentee
where feasible, and address the issue of researchers giving
away the patented invention to the public in a way that
damages the economic position of the patentee.
a. Limitation on Rights Licensed
The most important feature of the license is that it needs to
be strictly limited to the types of activities necessary to
research and not extended to purely commercial activities.
The Patent Act defines infringement thus:
[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.397
396. Whether or not such an argument would be successful is well beyond
the scope of this Article.
397. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
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In general, the researcher should not need to offer to sell,
sell, or import the patented invention to use it in research, so
the license should not include these rights.398 The patentee
should retain all these rights to commercialize the invention.399
Only the rights to make or use the patented invention for
research purposes on the funded research project should be
included in the license.
This limitation would prevent
researchers from using the research license to exploit the
technology commercially.400
However, this limitation may create problems in certain
situations. For example, a licensed researcher often will want
to transfer particular research materials to another
government-funded researcher who is also licensed.
For
instance, the licensed researcher might place a patented gene
into a new expression vector401 that makes it more useful (but
still infringing). Other licensed researchers may also wish to
use the new vector/gene system. Rather than trying to recreate
the vector themselves, these latter researchers will commonly
ask the first researcher to send them bacterial cells containing
the new vector, which they can then propagate and use to
obtain the expression vector as needed.
Normally, such a transaction will not raise any problems.
However, if the material is expensive to create or to ship, the
The
first researcher might desire to recover costs.402
introduction of money into the transfer arguably converts the
transaction into a “sale,” which is not covered by the license.
The license could address this issue in several ways. It could
specify that such recovery of costs is not a “sale” for purposes of
398. As noted, patent rights are divisible, and so the proposed license may
be constructed to exclude commercialization rights. See SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 117, at 4.
399. Or, more precisely, to prevent others from commercializing it. The
patent code makes clear that a patentee has only the right to exclude others
from commercializing the invention, see 35 U.S.C. § 271; a patent gives the
patentee no positive right to do anything. In the present context, the
distinction is of little practical importance—assuming there is no other
limitation on the sale of the technology, excluding others leaves the patentee
as the sole seller of the technology.
400. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58 (making a similar distinction).
401. An expression vector is a DNA construct that allows a gene cloned into
it to be expressed as protein in a particular expression system. Such vectors
are generally propagated in bacterial cells, allowing for easy creation of large
quantities of the vector as needed.
402. This typically would not be the case for a simple DNA construct, but it
might be true of, for example, a model organism such as a mouse or rabbit.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1028852

470

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 7:2

the license, or specifically grant the right to make this type of
sale and no other. Alternatively, the license could simply
exclude the right to make such sales and require that the
licensees get specific permission for each such transfer.
b. Sublicensing
The license will also need to address the issue of
sublicensing. The license should allow limited sublicensing
when it is integral to advancing the research needs of the
licensee, but not for commercialization.403 For example, the
researcher should be allowed to sublicense an outside firm to
custom manufacture a necessary piece of apparatus, but not to
sell that apparatus to anyone else. And similar to the
reimbursement issue discussed above, the licensee should be
allowed to reimburse the sublicensee for the costs of making
the apparatus. However, this right should be subject to an
important limitation: A manufacturing subcontract should be
allowed only if the patentee is not itself selling such a piece of
apparatus; otherwise, the sublicense will have a direct adverse
impact on the patentee.404 The sublicensing issue might also
arise during clinical research, when the researcher requires
subjects to perform some sort of infringing test or treatment on
themselves as part of the research project. The license
agreement should cover such uses, and the patentee should not
be able to sue the subjects directly for infringement.405
c. Notice to the Patentee
Another licensing issue is notification of the patentee. The
license could require the researcher to notify the patentee that
he or she is using the patented method or device pursuant to
the government license, so that the patentee can monitor
403. Of course, the latter limitation will largely be built into the license—
since the researcher lacks the right to sell, it cannot sublicense that right to
another party.
404. This limitation addresses the potential problems the proposed license
might create for kits and apparatus in biotechnology research discussed above.
405. But see Kimberly Blanton, Corporate Takeover: Exploiting the U.S.
Patent System, a Single Company Has Gained Control over Genetic Research
and Testing for Breast Cancer. and Scientists, Doctors, and Patients Have to
Play by Its Rules, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2002, § 2 (Magazine) (reporting on
a commercial firm asserting that sharing the results of a clinical test with the
patient makes the testing a commercial use, even if the use of the results for
research use is not).
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compliance with the license.406
However, while this
requirement might make sense if the researcher knows that he
or she is infringing, the researcher will often simply be
unaware of the infringement.
Indeed, one of the key
advantages of the proposed license is that researchers will not
have to keep close track of all government-funded patents that
they might be infringing.407 The license could require notice
anytime the researcher is aware of an infringement, but have
no consequences for failure to notify when the researcher is
unaware of the infringement, coupled with no affirmative duty
on the part of the researcher to seek out patents that might be
infringed.
d. Giving Away the Technology
One final issue is the potential problem of researchers
giving away the patented technology to others (typically the
public), because they believe that the commercial products are
too expensive. For example, some researchers have complained
that genetic tests for diseases are overpriced.408 A commonly
cited example of this problem is the test for potentially
dangerous mutants of the breast-cancer susceptibility genes
BRCA1 and BRCA2.409 Myriad Genetics holds the patents on
the tests and has been very aggressive about enforcing them.410
Only a few laboratories approved by Myriad are allowed to
perform the tests,411 and as a consequence the tests are very
expensive.412 This situation has led to wide dissatisfaction in
406. See Mueller, supra note 174, at 58-59 (suggesting a notice scheme for
the experimental use exemption).
407. This point is closely related to the discussion of government-wide
unity presented earlier. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
408. See, e.g., Anna Schissel, Jon F. Merz & Mildred K. Cho, Survey
Confirms Fears About Licensing of Genetic Tests, 402 NATURE 118, 118 (1999)
(criticizing exclusive licensing of genetic test patents as leading to their “being
used to monopolize the testing services”).
409. See generally Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing
the Development and Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH
L.J. 123 (2002) (providing the history of the gene, its testing, and the
controversy surrounding the patents on the gene and testing).
410. Id. at 136 (“Myriad holds patents on the two BRCA genes in the U.S.,
Europe, [and] Canada . . . . Myriad has continued to aggressively enforce its
patent rights in the U.S., and is also beginning to do so internationally, most
recently in Canada and Europe.”).
411. Id. at 136 (“Commercial laboratories . . . were systematically
threatened with litigation until Myriad became the sole commercial provider
of BRCA testing in the U.S.”)
412. See id. at 133-34 (listing prices for various services); see also Jordan
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the medical community, which feels that such important tests
Their
should be cheaper and more widely available.413
dissatisfaction is furthered by the fact that initial identification
of the gene was funded, in part, by the NIH.414 The medical
community has expressed similar dissatisfaction over a variety
of patented tests for other disease genes.415
Immunity from infringement liability would create a
strong temptation for these disgruntled researchers to take
direct action against the manufacturer by supplying the tests
free of charge.416 Such activity should not be protected by the
proposed license, as it is not part of furthering the research
enterprise but is merely an attempt to undercut the patentee’s
economic position, even though no direct “sale” is involved. On
the other hand, if the funded research does in fact require such
tests, then the researcher should be able to conduct them
without liability.417 The license terms should therefore clearly
spell out what making and using is appropriate as research
under the license and what is not.
Myriad’s policies regarding research use of BRCA testing
suggest one possible strategy. Myriad has a special license
Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control over Predictive Breast
Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public
Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics BRCA Patent Controversy, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 133, 149 (2004) (discussing costs of the BRCA tests);
Edward Weck, Note, Exclusive Licensing of DNA Diagnostics: Is There a
Negative Effect on Quantity and Quality of Healthcare Delivery that Compels
NIH Rulemaking?, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1057, 1079-80 (2005) (same).
413. See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 137-38 (describing reactions
against commercial testing); Blanton, supra note 405, at 21-25 (giving
reactions of researchers and doctors to Myriad’s patent policies).
414. See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 131 (“[The BRCA1] research
was supported in part by funding from the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly,
but also from government agencies such as the NIH which provided Skolnick
[one of Myriad’s founders] with more than $5 million specifically to look for
BRCA1.”).
415. See, e.g., Weck, supra note 412, at 1078-89 (describing several
patented genetic tests and the reactions of professional medical organizations
to them).
416. Indeed, the Canadian government feels so strongly on this point that
it has refused to recognize the patents. See Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at
140-44. European groups have been similarly forceful in opposing the
European versions of the patents. See id. at 138-40; Paradise, supra note 412,
at 136-45.
417. Cf. Blanton, supra note 405 (describing research into the early stages
of breast cancer that was halted because it required patient testing that would
have infringed Myriad’s patents).
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program for NIH research, allowing researchers to perform
tests as long as they do not charge the patients for them;
alternatively, Myriad will perform the testing for the
researchers at a greatly reduced cost.418 A condition of the
program is that the results not be given to the patient.
According to Myriad, passing the results on to patients is the
“very bright line” at which the testing crosses into the
commercial realm and should be treated accordingly.419
Alternatively, the license might define the right in terms of
interference with the patentee’s economic position: If the
researcher is simply replacing the patentee’s product, rather
than using the invention to further his or her own research
project, then the use is impermissible.420
In practice, this type of giving away of the patented
invention may not turn out to be a problem, as performing the
tests does involve costs to the tester that must be paid
somewhere, and finding funding to cover these costs is likely to
be difficult. Even if such funding is available, it is unlikely to
come in the form of an NIH grant (since the hypothetical use is
to undercut the patentee, not advance a research project), and
so the license becomes irrelevant. However, given the strong
resentment that many in the research community have against
diagnostic testing patents, the license terms should plan for the
possibility.
3. Participation
Another key issue under the proposed license is deciding
who gets to benefit from the government license, and, as a
corollary, who must license the patents arising out of their
research to others who are eligible for the license. In many
cases, funds from the government are insufficient to support
the entire research project, and thus much research conducted
with government funding is also supported by other funding
sources.421 One possibility is to set a percentage cut-off, below

418. See id. at 14, 27.
419. Id. at 20 (“[Dr. Gregory] Critchfield[, President of Myriad’s Laboratory
Division,] explains, ‘If you give test results back to patients, it crosses over the
line, and it’s no longer a simple research test.’ That, he says, ‘is really a very
bright line.’”).
420. Intellectual property aficionados will note the analogy to the copyright
fair use doctrine.
421. See, e.g., Williams-Jones, supra note 409, at 131 (stating that Myriad’s
BRCA1 research was funded by both Eli Lilly and government agencies).
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which the researcher is exempted from the license.422 These
researchers would not be eligible to use patents covered by the
proposed Bayh-Dole license, but they also would not have to
subject any patents arising out of the research to it. However,
a better approach is to make the system “all-or-nothing.” Any
research project that receives any government funding is
required to participate in the Bayh-Dole licensing scheme. Any
other system would become a bureaucratic headache, with the
NIH and researchers constantly trying to figure out which side
of the line the project is on and whether it participates in the
proposed license scheme.423
The potential impact of such broad participation is hard to
evaluate. Broad participation might create an incentive for
researchers always to attempt to get at least a small amount of
government funding in order to take advantage of the right to
use the patents under the proposed license. On the other hand,
broad participation might cause some projects to steer clear of
government funding to avoid subjecting any resulting patents
to the proposed license.
An “all-or-nothing” system lets
researchers make the decision for themselves and then stick to
it safely and easily.
D. RELATED PROPOSALS
Other commentators have made related proposals for
giving basic researchers increased access to patented products
and methods. One such proposal appears in the National
Research Council’s recently completed comprehensive study of
the future of the patent system, reported in a book entitled A

422. See Michel, supra note 324, at 408 (“A research project may be funded
by both federal and private sources. Therefore it is necessary to set a
minimum amount of government funding before the exception becomes
applicable, perhaps 50%.”).
423. An example may help clarify the difficulty. Assume that the cutoff is
set at 20%. A researcher receiving $50,000 from the NIH and $150,000 from
an industrial partner would be eligible for the license (the NIH is providing
25% of the funding). Now, suppose the project is going well, and so the
industrial partner provides another $100,000. The NIH contribution is now
only 17%, and so the researcher is no longer eligible for the license. Next,
however, the NIH might renew the grant, providing another $50,000. Now the
researcher is again eligible for the license (the NIH is providing 29% of the
funding). Assessing potential infringement liability in such a constantly
shifting funding situation would be extremely difficult for the researcher to
manage.
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Patent System for the 21st Century.424 The report concludes
with a chapter containing “Seven Recommendations for a 21stCentury Patent System.”425 One of the seven recommendations
is presented in a subchapter that proposes to “Shield Some
Research Uses of Patent Inventions from Infringement
This subchapter first discusses the Federal
Liability.”426
Circuit’s Madey decision427 and its possible consequences for
It then explores some possible
basic researchers.428
mechanisms for shielding basic researchers from patent
infringement liability, including provisions in foreign law and
scholarly proposals.429 However, the report concludes that, for
various reasons, none of the proposals are feasible.430
As a solution, the report looks to an existing statute that in
effect codifies eminent domain over patents.431 Under the
statute, when the United States infringes a patent, the
patentee’s only remedy is a suit in the Court of Federal Claims
for money damages; injunctive relief is not available against
the federal government.432 Furthermore, this limitation on
liability extends to those entities doing work “for the
Government and with the authorization or consent of the
Government.”433 The report concludes that the government
should explicitly extend this authorization and consent to all
As a consequence, suits
federally funded researchers.434
alleging infringement against these researchers would become
suits against the United States, and would therefore be limited
to money damages; research-threatening injunctions would not
be available.435
The report then makes the same correlation made above:436
While distinguishing basic biotechnology research from applied
biotechnology research is extremely difficult, receipt of federal
424. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172.
425. Id. at 81-129.
426. Id. at 108-17.
427. Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
428. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 108-10.
429. See id. at 111-15.
430. See id.
431. Id. at 115-17 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000)).
432. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
433. Id.
434. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 115-16.
435. See id. at 116.
436. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
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funding can serve as a rough proxy indicating that the funded
research is basic.437 Using government funding as a proxy lets
the government extend its sovereign immunity to protect basic
researchers from infringement liability. The cost, of course, is
that the government must pay for any infringement damages.
The report suggests that the Court of Federal Claims has
historically limited damages against the government in patent
cases under the statute, and that therefore the number of cases
(and the damages awarded) should be relatively small.438
The report glosses over a small but key point in the
statutory language. The government has the power to give its
“authorization or consent” only when the research is “for the
Government.”439 As discussed above in Part III.C.1, declaring
an activity to be “for the Government” can have significant
legal consequences, not all of which are desirable. The report
does note that the authorization “should be carefully
circumscribed to avoid conferring unrelated legal protections,
for example, from tort liability.”440 However, it discusses
neither how to achieve such a circumscription nor whether such
limits on liability are even permissible under the statute. It
also fails to address the implications of governmental control
contained in declaring the research to be “for the
Government.”441
In a footnote, the report notes that the related language
appearing in the Bayh-Dole Act regarding the government’s
retained license in the research it funds might be an
alternative mechanism for implementing its research shield.442
It concludes that this approach would be less suitable because
it would be less broad, applying only to patents on technology
developed with government funding, rather than to all
patents.443 However, the report fails to note the corresponding
advantage of using the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act. Under
the statute, what the government receives in exchange for
funding the research and allowing the funding recipient to
437. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 116.
438. See id.
439. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000).
440. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 172, at 116.
441. See supra notes 370-382 and accompanying text (discussing the
implications of declaring research to be “for or on behalf of the United States”).
442. See id. at 115 n.53.
443. See id.
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patent it is a license right.444 By having the government extend
that license to the researchers that it funds, rather than using
its eminent domain powers, the proposed Bayh-Dole license
and the report’s discarded suggestion would spare the
government from having to defend any patent suits or pay any
damages—they would all be subsumed under the license.
Dr. Suzanne Michel also makes a related proposal.445 Dr.
Michel first discusses the traditional common law experimental
use exemption and problems with its implementation.446 Next,
she considers previous proposals for a codified broader
experimental use exemption and explains why none of them is
appropriate.447 She then makes a two-part proposal. The first
part is “to grant [nonprofit] researchers [such as universities]
the benefit of a clarified experimental use exception, which
would exempt them from infringement when studying and
improving a patented invention. The exemption should extend
only to research use and not to commercialization of a
The second part (which the author says is
product.”448
intimately entwined with the first, so that the two should only
be implemented in tandem)449 is to “appl[y a] broad
experimental use exception to patents resulting from federally
funded research so that the patent can be used without liability
for infringement up to the point of commercialization. The
proposal exempts any researcher, whether for profit or not,
from infringement when using a federally funded invention.”450

444. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
445. Michel, supra note 324.
446. See id. at 376-88.
447. See id. at 388-97.
448. Id. at 397-98.
449. See id. at 400.
450. Id. Professor Eisenberg, without much analysis, also makes a
proposal similar to Dr. Michel’s second part:
For example, one might add a research exemption to Bayh-Dole that
would protect researchers who later use patented research tools
developed with government funds from liability. Patent holders
would still be able to enforce their rights against those who make, use
or sell the inventions as commercial end products, including
competitors who sell the invention to investigators for use as a
research tool, but not against those who merely make and use the
invention in their own research. Obviously, such an exemption would
limit the value of patent rights in any government-sponsored
invention that is useful primarily or exclusively as a research tool,
although the protection against competitors who would sell the
product to researchers provides some measure of protection.
Eisenberg, supra note 352, at 173.
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Thus, Dr. Michel would implement a broader exemption
than the proposed Bayh-Dole license: “Nonprofit” researchers
can experiment on any patented invention,451 while anyone can
do non-commercial research on patents arising from
government-funded research. While this broader exemption
would encompass the proposed Bayh-Dole license and therefore
have many of the same advantageous effects, its increased
breadth might create new problems. Because it subjects a
much larger group of patents to free use by a much wider range
of users, its impact on the patent incentive is likely to be much
more significant, and it may lead to a corresponding reduction
in corporate research and development. Furthermore, the
breadth of the exemption requires that Dr. Michel exclude
research tools from its scope (otherwise, companies would have
no incentive to create such tools, as they would be free to
The inclusion of research tools created with
anyone).452
government funding is an important advantage of the proposed
Bayh-Dole license.
The broader exemption also destroys the symmetry
between government funding of the research leading to the
patented research and government funding of the subsequent
users of the technology, removing the equitable appeal of the
proposed Bayh-Dole license and making it politically less
palatable. In particular, the expansion of the license to allow
all “nonprofit” researchers to experiment on any patent will
almost certainly be opposed by patentees who funded their own
research and do not wish to see it “given away” to potential
rivals. When the government funded the inventions in the first
place, however, subsequent licensees are in a much weaker
position to make this argument. Similarly, the destruction of
the symmetry removes the analogy to a patent pool, as the
licensing is no longer reciprocal—researchers may get access to
the pool without contributing to it, and contributing to the pool
does not guarantee access to it. Thus, the advantages of
creating a rough biotechnology patent pool are lost.
Professor Mike Mireles suggests a change to the Bayh-Dole
Act that is related to the proposed Bayh-Dole license in a
different way.453 Professor Mireles first examines the patent
451. Dr. Michel does exclude research tools from this exemption.
Michel, supra note 324, at 398 n.151.
452. See id.
453. Mireles, supra note 173.
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system as it applies to biotechnology research.454 He next turns
to an examination of the anticommons problem, focusing on
whether empirical evidence supports the theoretical
construct.455 He concludes that, although the evidence does not
directly support the existence of an anticommons, it also cannot
rule it out.456 Professor Mireles then proposes a solution to
help prevent or mitigate any anticommons that might arise.457
After first proposing that the government commission a “Study
of the Effect of Government Policy on Biotechnology
Innovation” to resolve the issue of the existence of an
anticommons,458 his solution then focuses on the use of
industry-wide patent pools to facilitate the exchange of
research tools, and government action to promote the formation
of such pools.459 In particular, he first proposes that the
government create a database of research tools so that those
desirous of using the technology or forming a pool with it can
Second, he proposes amending the
find each other.460
government’s reserved license to patents obtained on
government-funded inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act to
make it transferable rather than non-transferable.461 However,
the license would be transferable only in very limited
circumstances. Specifically, the government would have only
the right to transfer the license to an industry-wide patent
pool, and only when the patentee refused to put the patent into
the pool itself and this refusal jeopardized the viability of the
pool.462
Although Professor Mireles’s proposal and the proposed
Bayh-Dole license share a view of patent pools as a valuable
tool in facilitating biotechnology research, the two proposals
focus on different ways of achieving the desired result.
Professor Mireles sees the government as merely assisting the
formation of the pools; the formation of the pools themselves is
left to industry.463 Under the proposed Bayh-Dole license, on
454. See id. at 148-71.
455. See id. at 171-194. Professor Mireles also explores past proposed
solutions for dealing with the anticommons problem. See id. at 194-224.
456. See id. at 192-94.
457. See id. at 225-34.
458. See id. at 225-30.
459. See id. at 230-31.
460. See id. at 231.
461. See id. at 231-33.
462. See id. at 233.
463. See id. at 230-34.
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the other hand, the government creates a rough patent pool
among recipients of government funding, with the hope that it
might either be expanded into a true industry-wide patent pool
or at least serve as the model for one. However, the two
proposals are not really incompatible and might both be useful
tools for improving access to patented research tools.
Finally, the proposal fits well with the NIH’s recently
introduced policy for facilitating the dissemination of results
from NIH-sponsored research.464 The new data access policy
requests (but does not require) that all NIH-funded researchers
provide the NIH with electronic copies of all articles that result
from funded research and are published in peer-reviewed
scientific journals.465 After a suitable embargo period, these
electronic copies are then placed in an online archive accessible
to the public.466 The copyright in the research papers remains
with its owner (either the researcher or the publishing journal);
the NIH archive merely facilitates access to the research
paper.467 According to the NIH, the purpose of the policy is to
increase the public’s access to the research results for which it
paid.468 The proposed Bayh-Dole license is entirely consistent
with this purpose: Both have the goal of increasing access to
government-funded research (although the NIH data access
policy is broader in that it encourages access to all the public,
rather than just other government-funded researchers).
Furthermore, both policies specifically limit this access to noncommercial uses—in both cases, the right holder retains all
commercial rights. Thus, the proposed Bayh-Dole license
464. See Policy on Enhancing Public Access to Archived Publications
Resulting from NIH-Funded Research, 70 Fed. Reg. 6891, 6891 (Feb. 9, 2005)
[hereinafter
NIH
Public
Access
Policy],
available
at
http://publicaccess.nih.gov/Enhanced_Public_Access.pdf; Elias A. Zerhouni,
NIH Public Access Policy, 306 SCIENCE 1895 (2004) (discussing the initial
proposal for the policy).
465. See NIH Public Access Policy, supra note 464, at 6899. Recent data
indicates that the policy has been largely ignored, leading to calls for the data
access policy to be made mandatory. See Rick Weiss, Government Health
Researchers Pressed to Share Data at No Charge, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2006,
at A17 (discussing Congressional concerns and proposed legislation to address
this failing).
466. See NIH Public Access Policy, supra note 464, at 6900.
467. See id. at 6897.
468. See id. at 6892 (“The Policy is intended to: . . . make published results
of NIH-funded research more readily accessible to the public, health care
providers, educators, and scientists.”).
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comports nicely with the current trend of NIH policies on
access to research.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Bayh-Dole Act has, in many respects, succeeded in its
goal of getting the results of government-funded research into
the hands of industry so that its fruits can be enjoyed by the
taxpayers who paid for its creation. However, in some cases,
that success has come at the cost of limiting or taxing future
research, with no direct gain from such limits. Thus, many
commentators have proposed various changes to the Act that
will help avoid these costs without destroying the benefits.
One such proposal is made by Professors Arti Rai and
Rebecca Eisenberg, who argue for a scheme under which the
NIH (or, presumably, any funding agency) reviews each
research funding agreement, predicts what invention or
inventions might arise from it, and then decides whether any
such inventions would be better utilized if they are covered by
patent rights (giving private industry an incentive to develop
them) or left in the public domain (so that all who desire have
free access to technology that requires little or no further
development). Depending on this assessment, the final funding
agreement is then drafted to allow or forbid the funding
recipient to seek patents on any resulting inventions. This
proposal suffers from some serious drawbacks in
implementation. In particular, the NIH does not have the
expertise, resources, or appropriate personnel to perform such a
task, and it is likely to succumb to a variety of biases in trying.
More important, however, is the difficulty that any analyst
would have in attempting to see into the future and make the
necessary ex ante determinations as to which path is
preferable. Thus, the proposed reform is likely to fail in
practice.
Instead, this Article proposes an alternative reform: Allow
all researchers whose work is funded by federal funds to have a
limited, royalty-free license to make or use, for research
purposes on the funded project, any patent for which the
underlying invention was developed with federal funds. The
license should be strictly limited to research activities and
should not extend to the right to sell or otherwise
commercialize the patented invention; the patentee should
retain all rights to commercialize the invention. Under this
proposed license, government funding serves as a proxy for
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basic researchers, who need access to fundamental research
that has broad application. This proposal should provide broad
access to technology that was patented under the Bayh-Dole
Act without significantly undermining patent incentives.
Furthermore, it has the advantage of being simple to
implement. It also serves to implement a limited experimental
use exemption, and it could also serve as a rough patent pool
that can pave the way to a future true patent pool for the
biotechnology industry. Thus, the proposed Bayh-Dole license
has many advantages and can help facilitate access to basic
technology in the biotechnology field.
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